2017年4月3日 星期一

Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Movement Losing Hope

500,000 people demonstration, referendum for universal suffrage, 79-days Occupy Movement……efforts to fight for democracy in the past decade or so have not yet paid off. The Chief Executive election of Hong Kong held on March 26, 2017 remained as a political game dominated by the power elites, most of whom have direct or indirect political and economic relationships with the Beijing government. Unlike the past four Chief Executive elections, the democrats neither boycotted the Beijing-controlled election nor nominated a candidate to expose the loopholes of the existing political system. This time, they chose to support a pro-China, and somewhat anti-democracy, candidate in the name of public opinion.

To understand the democrats’ weird move, we need to have a brief knowledge about the political system which has shaped the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong over the past two decades. Since the handover of sovereignty from Britain to China in 1997, Hong Kong has become the Special Administrative Region of China. The first two Chief Executives of Hong Kong were elected by the Election Committee (EC), a committee formed by 800 major political and business figures who purport to represent the majority view of the Hong Kong people. As stipulated in the Basic Law, the mini-constitution of Hong Kong written by the Beijing government and some pro-Beijing politicians in the 1980s, such undemocratic setting would ultimately be replaced by one-person-one-vote within 10 years after the handover. However, the promise has never realized. Through re-interpreting the Basic Law in 2004 and 2007, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) of the Beijing government delayed the progress of democratization and ruled that no universal suffrage would be held in Hong Kong until 2017. Despite such promise, the NPCSC has set high threshold for the nominating process of the Chief Executive election, meaning that such “universal suffrage” could easily be manipulated by Beijing and would not be a genuine one. Political reform based on the NPCSC decision was thus vetoed in 2014 and the Chief Executive election of this year continued to adopt the previous method of election: a 1200-members EC [1] is going to decide who is the leader of Hong Kong. Although some democrats can become a member of the EC under the current institutional design, their voices are never loud enough to influence the election result [2]. All they can do is to nominate a pro-democracy candidate to make some dissent voices (like what they did in 2007 and 2012) or use their votes to force the pro-Beijing candidates to make some concession to the pro-democracy movement.

Capitalizing the momentum of the 79-days Occupy Movement in 2014 and the growing discontent towards the Beijing authority in the civil society, the Hong Kong democrats made a small breakthrough to obtain more than 300 seats in the EC election last year. Although this could be a good chance to at least make a stronger democratic claim and advance the pro-democracy movement, the democrats ruined it all. On the one hand, they did not come up with a clear goal of what they should do other than stopping the incumbent Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying, an assertive hardliner and a pro-Beijing politician, from running for five more years. On the other, they were obviously unprepared to deal with the landslide support for one of the Chief Executive candidates, John Tsang Chun-wah, the former Financial Secretary of the Hong Kong government, in the civil society.

The success of John Tsang was unexpected for both the democrats and observers, but it could not be simply understood as an excellent political spinning project. Instead, it should be interpreted as a mobilization of political emotions. To compete with his major contender, Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor [3], the former Chief Secretary of the government, who was widely perceived as Beijing’s favourite, John Tsang popularized himself among the Hong Kong citizens not so much by a drastically different policy agenda but by an emotional mobilization. Contrary to Carrie Lam, the image of whom was often seen as the parallel of Leung Chun-ying, John Tsang presented himself not only as a benevolent leader but as a good husband, a friendly former fencing coach, a martial arts lover, and a guy who loves the local, grassroots culture of Hong Kong. Blurring the line between the public and the private realms, John Tsang showed the public his “authentic self”, something people long for in the era in which people no longer trust the politicians and in which political emotions have increasingly been managed [4] by the Beijing authority in the name of patriotism. Subverting the conventional wisdom that politics is dirty among the Hong Kong citizens, John Tsang’s image was so fresh and friendly that people could not stop following him.

John Tsang’s play of political emotions was much more than that. Rightly identified anxiety, anger, and hatred as the dominant emotional climate [5] of the Hong Kong society over the past few years, John Tsang deployed “Trust, Hope, Unity” as his campaign slogan. By contrasting the current devastating socio-political situation of Hong Kong with the good old days of the early 1990s [6] in his propaganda, John Tsang effectively manipulated the notion of hope to invoke memory of the past society, a depoliticized society with rapid economic growth. Yet, it was by no means a progressive political vision. Scholars of Hong Kong studies have generally agreed that what apparent political stability and economic prosperity of the 1990s masked were the unquestioning support of a neoliberalist market economy and the tacit acceptance of an undemocratic (but administratively efficient) government. If John Tsang was advocating a political vision, it was more about bringing Hong Kong back to an era in which all inconvenient truths were hidden and all people were economic and apolitical animals than mobilizing people to care about the political future of the city to fight for a democratic, free, and equal society. John Tsang’s notion of hope was about the future, but such future was articulated with an unachievable and unprogressive past. In a political climate filled with anxiety, anger, and hatred, nostalgia simply fueled hope. John Tsang’s emotional mobilization worked extremely well. Just before the election, he achieved a support rate of over 60% in public opinion poll, almost a double ahead of Carrie Lam.

Hope, an emotion usually used by the leftist and the liberal, was effectively appropriated by John Tsang. Confronting anxiety, anger, and hatred, John Tsang provided the Hong Kong people with the subversive emotions of hope, happiness, and optimism. The Hong Kong people were once again mobilized and unified [7] like what happened during the 79-days Occupy Movement in 2014. Yet this time they were not standing for the broader liberal, democratic goals but a politician who was a core supporter of the neoliberalist market economy, who has never made any concrete pledge to democratization, and who was at most a rebel within the pro-establishment camp. Debates, disputes, and disagreements were haunting the democratic camp in the past two months. Social cleavage was once again deepened due to diverged opinions regarding whether the democratic EC members should abstain or vote for a popular candidate who might never help advancing democracy. At the end, the Hong Kong democrats chose to dance with the devil and cast their votes to John Tsang in the name of public opinion. Indeed, no matter which side they choose and no matter who wins the election [8], they have already lost the heart of the Hong Kong people. The mainstream public sentiment has already chosen to side with a pro-establishment political figure rather than the democrats and trusted that he could bring a better “future”.

Losing hope, the Hong Kong democrats are losing ground. The democrats will have a hard time to regain the momentum of the pro-democracy movement in coming years. Perhaps the first and foremost task for them is to learn how to do efficient emotional work in political mobilization. Anger and hatred have been deployed for mobilizing democratic campaigns in the past two to three years, but these two emotions alone have been insufficient to make good impact, as previous campaigns have repeatedly proven. So what would be the right and effective emotions for mobilizing successful pro-democracy campaigns? It is time for them to learn from John Tsang.

[1] The number of EC member was increased from 800 to 1200 in 2012 under the political reform in 2010.
[2] All EC members must go through an election. However, such election has been tightly controlled by the Beijing government through its invisible hand in the political and business sectors of the Hong Kong society. This means most EC members are likely to be pro-China, allowing the Beijing government to control the Chief Executive election easily.
[3] Another candidate of the election was Woo Kwok-hing, a retired judge.
[4] Sociologist Arlie Hochschild argues in her book The Managed Heart that emotions have been more and more falling under the control of capitalist institutions whose goal is to increase consumption. But the more emotions are being managed, the more people search for an authentic self and genuine expression of emotions.
[5] This is largely the result of the massive Occupy Movement in 2014. On the one hand, people who support democratization have become more hostile to the Beijing authority, the Hong Kong government, and the Hong Kong police, and become more worried about the political future of the city. On the other hand, the powerholders have mobilized even stronger counter-movement to halt democratization. Social cleavage has been deepened over the past few years and mutual trust has been declining.
[6] Despite their apparent political dispute over democratization of Hong Kong, both the British colonial government and the Beijing government had joined to carry out a political-economic engineering project to make Hong Kong as prosperous as possible before the handover. For the British colonial government, they wanted a glorious departure. For the Beijing government, they wanted a respectable city to celebrate the national political project of re-gaining the sovereignty of Hong Kong. Political stability and economic prosperity were hence the two main themes in the dominant discourses of Hong Kong in the early 1990s.
[7] It is believed that John Tsang’s supporters come from three camps: the centralists, the mild democratic supporters, and the mild pro-China supporters.

[8] At the end, Carrie Lam won the election by securing 777 votes, while John Tsang and Woo Kwok-hing could only manage to obtain 365 votes and 21 votes respectively. It is interpreted that the Beijing authority has done a lot behind the scenes to help Carrie Lam to secure her votes.

2017年3月29日 星期三

向曾俊華學習

人老轉數慢,想梳理一下「曾俊華現象」一些有關政治情感的問題,想了幾天還是想不通。只能草草地總結幾點:

1. 所謂政治情感,不單單是公關技巧的問題,亦不是因為你思想不夠精闢敏銳而被政壇騙子蒙騙。情感存在於社會關係中,有其結構性。情感是個人感受到的,亦是屬於社會大眾的。所謂情感,是政治論述、影像及行動產生出來的「後果」,不是單純發自內心的生理「感受」。每個社會有其主流情感,是社會成員共同感受到的。權力關係既影響政治論述及行動,亦塑造主流情感的建構,但主流情感可以被挑戰,製造另類情感。曾俊華過去兩個多月給予香港人的,正是一個透過生產另類情感,挑戰恐懼、焦慮、仇恨等主流情感的政治動員。

2. 社會學家Arlie R. Hochschild說,我們正身處一個時刻都在「管理情感」的年代。服務員對你笑,不是真心歡迎你,而是透過管理自己的情感和情感表達方式,令你感覺良好,從而增加消費。此邏輯在政治領域同樣適用。在擠眉弄眼的年代,當權者天天對你說國家是在關心你、為你好;要你愛國、對著國旗心情激動。但Hochschild指出,情感愈是被管理,人們便愈追求所謂「真摰」的情感和「發自內心」的舉動。曾俊華比林鄭受歡迎,除了是因為林鄭面目猙獰,更加是因為曾俊華夠「真」。仁慈的劍擊教練、熱愛中國武術、和下屬玩埋一堆、和市民玩「曾.connect」、「曾.心mean」,全都是展示最「曾」一面。

3. 「希望」是曾俊華競選口號其中一個主打重點。現於浸大任教的社會學家Jack M. Barbalet指出,情感往往與回憶及過去經驗扣連,從而指導未來的行動方向。「希望」之所以成功動員群眾,除了是對比起當下的恐懼、焦慮、仇恨所產生出來的效果,亦是因為重新勾起在90年代香港出現的一系列美好(但回歸後一直未能落實的)想像:繁榮安定、社會穩定、遠離政治(而前設僅是有一個正正常常、循規蹈矩的政府及官僚架構)。曾俊華所說的「休養生息」,換個說法就是90年代的「維持現狀」。還是杜sir的話夠精警:「未來要睇到嘅和諧嘅香港……為未來三十年好好地建立番一個我地由細到大,只有希望嘅香港」。這個香港,其實就是90年代只管經濟發展、去政治化的香港社會。今天社會、政治烏煙瘴氣的環境下,90年代再次成為香港人對未來的寄託,而「曾俊華」就好像一個empty signifier,讓大家將所有美好想像通通投射進去,團結香港人。

4. 我們不難理解為何一班進步左派會看這場選戰看到咬牙切齒。「希望」本是他們的「專用主打」情感,這次卻被一個新自由主義者、建制派中人挪用,而玩得有聲有色,出神入化,做到不少社運都做不到的動員效果。如何向曾俊華學習,奪回對「希望」的發言權,導向進步、民主自由的方向,必然成為一眾民主派、左派的新難題。在此搬字過紙,引用幾篇文章談過的幾個觀點。雖然聽起來無甚新意,但希望拋磚引玉,刺激思考社會運動如何重奪情感動員的主導權。

Ron AminzadeDoug McAdam在一篇討論情感與社會運動的文章中指出,憤怒必須結合希望才能成功動員群眾。至於如何燃起希望,主要有以下幾點:

4a. 廣義的文化轉向,令人憧憬改變未來,造就社運形成,例如近年香港年青人的後物質價值轉向,造就多場大大小小的社會行動。但文化轉變不是一朝一夕形成,要深耕細作,才能改變主導文化話語權。例如梁啟智博士日前發表的「對抗林鄭行動綱領」所言,胡官也不是一早懂得談棕土,而是靠多個民間團體近年的努力才能帶起議題。因此,還是老套那句,要有希望,首先是不要絕望。深耕細作,自有回報。

4b. 政治機會的出現,是指既有政治版圖中的權力移位,為社會運動員帶來較大空間,令公民社會感覺到一絲取勝希望。雖然在港式精英分裂中,建制派的內部矛盾往往會隨著中央一鎚定音而火速歸位,令民主派拉攏部分商界的希望瞬間幻滅。但社會學家Jack M. Barbalet提到,恐懼不只局限於缺乏權力的人,手握權力的人有時亦會因恐懼(elite fear),怕自己既有地位動搖,而作出制度性的變革。商界在5年前梁振英上台時所出現的反彈,正好說明這種情緒。雖然本地商界與中共/紅色資本的裂痕會否進一步加深並非民主派能完全控制的事,但我們或者可以透過行動,讓本地商界體會封閉的政治制度及其衍生的官商勾結,會令其自食其果。例如幫襯小店、罷買四大地產商旗下的所有貨/樓,逼他們親嘗自己種下的惡果,變相拉攏/逼使他們成為民主運動一分子。這些都是我們能做的一小步。

4c. 累積每場小勝利的能量。雖然民主運動至今未成功,但由03七一計起,公民社會「贏粒糖」的次數也不少:利東街運動的由下而上重建方案、藍屋保育、菜園村成功爭取的集體搬村、雨傘運動中首次逼使政府對話…….雖然這些真的只是「小」勝利,但重提這些事件既不是失敗主義,亦不是打飛機自我安慰。須知道,即使成功如美國民權運動,也不是一朝一夕就完全改變不公平的社經制度。公民社會不需要妄自菲薄,因為「希望」的底氣就是從過去的小勝仗中積累出來的,重點是如何包裝和策略性運用這些資源。

5. 仇恨是過去兩、三年公民社會用來動員的主要情感。正如社會學家Helena Flam所言,當一個政體愈來愈封閉,仇恨作為動員的情感機會就愈大。但Flam亦指到,動員社運的情感可以由不同情感組合而成,帶來不同的動員效果和行動模式。世上沒有必勝的情感動員formula,學術研究不是包生仔。曾俊華選戰的成功,正正提醒我們,要檢視當下香港人不同的情感經驗和各種情感組合的可能性。如果大家recall一下看曾俊華宣傳片的經驗,相信都有一面看,一面會心微笑的時刻。今天,我們是否應重新檢視快樂抗爭的可能性及其能量?快樂又如何可以和信心、樂觀及希望等情感結合,產生不同的動員力。我只是想說,我們既不需摒棄憤怒和仇恨,也不需將快樂抗爭等同和理非非。我們不應過份標榜或污名化某一情感,因為成功的社運動員需要不同情感組合。例如雨運頭十多日的強大動員能力,正正是憤怒、仇恨、希望、快樂、樂觀、恐懼的有機組合。雨運最終的失敗,不是簡單的退場與否的問題,而是未能隨著形勢轉變而改變情感動員的模式,讓一、兩種情感(e.g. 憤怒、仇恨)過份主導,令運動逐漸失去本來擁有動員能力。


(轉載於《立場新聞》,題為「「曾俊華現象」背後的政治情感動員
https://www.thestandnews.com/politics/%E6%9B%BE%E4%BF%8A%E8%8F%AF%E7%8F%BE%E8%B1%A1-%E8%83%8C%E5%BE%8C%E7%9A%84%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB%E6%83%85%E6%84%9F%E5%8B%95%E5%93%A1/

只有兩條路:玩盡佢令議席過半 完全唔玩癱瘓制度

(寫於201682日)

1. 先殺在公眾知名度及支持度不高的陳浩天和楊繼昌,再殺在公眾心目中為畸呢怪一名的中出羊子,見你所謂民主派只是口頭譴責、網上鳩屌,大型動員欠奉,就可以放心做野。這叫試水溫。

2. 其實只要有正常智力,也能判斷確認書根本沒有法理依據,選管會只是一個行政機構,沒有權作政治決定,完。這點你知,我知,粱振英知、林鄭知、袁國強知,但既然你民主派沒有大型動員,極其量也只能申請不能改變任何決定的選舉呈請及遠水不能救近火的司法覆核,殺埋你梁天琦又如何?

3. 泛民眼前的選擇不多,但不應局限於司法覆核或衝台搶咪。司法覆核係要做,衝係要繼續衝,我對這兩個方法沒有負面評價,只是覺得不限於此。抗爭repertoire要常更新,如果只如何秀蘭所言「一眾泛民主流政黨回立法會後嚴正跟進」,港共政權真係開心都來唔切,因為在現有議會制度下,建制派真係驚你有牙。

4. 港共政權殺民族黨、梁天琦,但放青年新政、熱普城參選,分別在於前者打正旗號獨立,是完全否定現有憲法及議會制度,而後者充其量是推動意義仍相當模糊的民族自決,甚至只是所謂的永續基本法,對現有制度衝擊有限。如果如熱普城支持者話齌,對抗今次確認書事件的方法是將狂人帶入議會、以癲制癲,恐怕真係諗多左。因為「狂」最終只會被制度邏輯吸納,就如當年的掟蕉、掟杯,今天只等同R痕。

5. 改變現狀的路只有兩條,一是玩盡佢,令議席過半;二是完全唔玩。

前者的願景固然美好,但雷動計劃協調之困難,在此不贅。後者從來都是泛民禁忌,對於他們來說,失去議席就如失去打位置之戰的本錢。但今天已入閘的泛民是否應該想想,面對今天一個已經完全失去法理基礎的立法會選舉,玩下去又是否值得?玩下去的話固然可以藉今次議題,多贏一兩席,但是否亦同時加強了一個有確認書「僭建」的選舉的認受性?其實共產黨最不想見到的,不是一個有很多泛民的議會,而是一個都沒有泛民的議會,因為這才突顯它一言堂的真面目。

如果失去了所謂的否決權,而建制派藉此通過惡法,泛民換來的是更大的道德光環及更多的動員本錢。如果現在要說一句老土話,「團結一致,槍口對外」,那泛民可以做的就是集體杯葛選舉,以極低投票率突顯今次選舉的荒謬,同時將動員火力集中推倒2017小圈子特狗選舉,並借反確認書的餘勢,舉行自決公投,以(預料)進一步上升的港獨支持率向中共施壓。

又或者,泛民當選後立即辭職,就確認書議題舉行公投,將數年後司法覆核勝出後的重新選舉,變相提前舉行,將篩選制度徹底摧毀。只有集體唔玩,或集體走人,才能真正癱瘓一個失去法理基礎的制度。

【頭盔】係,我知,咁講係120%離地及理想化,所以我相信一切也不會發生。

(轉載於《立場新聞》:https://thestandnews.com/politics/%E5%8F%AA%E6%9C%89%E5%85%A9%E6%A2%9D%E8%B7%AF-%E7%8E%A9%E7%9B%A1%E4%BD%A2%E4%BB%A4%E8%AD%B0%E5%B8%AD%E9%81%8E%E5%8D%8A-%E5%AE%8C%E5%85%A8%E5%94%94%E7%8E%A9%E7%99%B1%E7%98%93%E5%88%B6%E5%BA%A6/