搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣的

轉不轉mewe？用不用signal？我個人好港豬好隨波逐流好無主見，跟大隊大家用乜就用乜。我向來唔會放太多嘢喺facebook，兩袖清風；whatsapp也從不backup data，要搬就搬。無所謂的原因，不是因為視mewe / signal為應許之地，而是因為我覺得，搬到哪裡，都是一樣。正確點說，搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣。

我相信大部分人思考是否轉場，都有起碼三個考慮：1) 平台是否獨立自主、2) 去中心化、3) 私隱保障。

關於1：很多人都視一個獨立自主而且非牟利的網絡平台為應許之地，十多年前的facebook就是如此。問題是，當一個平台開始擴張，甚至變成跨國企業，就會開始滲透著不少政治和經濟元素。但反過來，如果一個平台長期保持獨立自主而且非牟利，它的生存能力又有多持久？影響力又可以去到多闊？我想，獨立自主而且非牟利的網絡平台的確是存在的，但要數一個生命力強又有聚眾能力的平台，我想不出有哪個（連登這例子仍有待觀察）。因此，大家可以想像，若干年後的mewe，可能也會變成今日的facebook。網絡平台這回事，搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣。

關於2：一個有聚眾能力的平台是否能夠做到完完全全的去中心化，我本身就有懷疑。正如一個facebook page，一個網絡KOL的意見，本身就是一種具大台型態的東西。當然，在商業化的網絡世界下，很多企業及政治人物可以花錢在網絡上帶風向，影響輿論。因此，去中心化這個問題，很取決於用家的自省能力。如果你滿足於網絡世界內的echo chamber effect，那麼搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣的。

關於3：對於很多人來說，用一個網絡平台或手機app，只要私隱條款不是太過份，也不會太在意，畢竟這是方便性與私隱之間的取捨。因此，私隱保障這個問題，其實也很視乎用家的自省能力及敏感度。如開首所言，我向來不會放太多東西於網絡上，有時甚至會用一個鬼email account登錄某些網站。但如果你是一個乜鳩都擺上網的人，那麼沒有甚麼網絡平台是絕對安全的。最近有人指出mewe的私隱條款其實比facebook也不是好很多，所以大家不要期望在商業世界內，有私隱度百分百安全這回事，所以搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣的。

那麼轉場的真正原因又是甚麼呢？於我來說，轉場的本質就是一場消費者運動。一間企業（corporation）之所以是企業，是因為它既有富可敵國的財力，又有影響眾生的能力。但消費者仍可以vote by feet、運用其力量作良心消費，推動企業對社會負責（亦即corporate social responsibility）。當然，如果你從一個極品級左膠的角度出發，你一定會覺得推動企業負社會責任本身不能改變資本主義一分一毫，是沒有意義的。但消費者運動最重要的影響力，在於它可以告訴企業巨鯨，we are watching you，咪諗住亂來。

總括來說，不要期望商業化的網絡世界有甚麼應許之地。世界有太多二元對立，但事實是：地球上沒有用這個等於藍，用那個等於黃：也沒有用這個等於不安全，用那個等於安全。重點始終是用家本身對於網絡世界的反思能力，以及對網絡安全的敏感度。

而最最最重要的，其實是即使老大哥在現實/網絡世界監察著你，你有沒有那份有乜講乜，說出真相的勇氣。如果你無，那麼搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣的。

Can we compare the occupy action in the US Capitol with those in Hong Kong and Taiwan?

Violent clashes with police, storming the legislature, vandalizing properties in the parliamentary building …… All these happened in the United States, one of the most well-established democratic states in the world. The event in the US Capitol shocked the world and an interesting narrative followed. Messages from Chinese netizens flooded the Internet, trying to discredit the overall desirability of democracy and accusing Western media and politicians of upholding a “double standard.” They proclaimed, whereas the Western world blamed pro-Trump protesters as “mobs,” it praised activists in Hong Kong who broke into the legislature in 2019 as “democratic fighters.” This comparison is at once intriguing and confusing. Even CNN international correspondent, Will Ripley, made a similar tweet in Twitter [1]. In order to determine whether these claims are justified, let us first review two earlier occupy protests occurring in 2014 and 2019. 

The first case that needs to be reviewed is the Taiwanese Sunflower Movement in 2014. Since the rise of the Chinese economy in the early 2000s, the Beijing government has been using its economic power to entice Taiwan to establish a closer relation with mainland China—first economically and then politically. With the change of the ruling party of Taiwan from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party to the pro-unification Nationalist Party in 2008, a free trade pact, Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), was signed between the Beijing and Taipei governments in 2010 and the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) was added under ECFA in June 2013. Worried by the potential economic co-optation by an authoritarian state and angered by the lack of transparency in the local legislative process, Taiwanese student activists stormed the Legislative Yuan in March 2014 and occupied the building. Despite the relatively confrontational tactic, the occupation received widespread support from the Taiwanese society since the activists had exhausted all sorts of peaceful means before undertaking the break-in action. Having occupied the parliament for 24 days, the action successfully forced the Nationalist government to put the CSSTA on hold and safeguarded the corrosion of democracy in Taiwan. 

Five years after the Sunflower Movement, activists in Hong Kong learned the tactic from their Taiwanese counterparts and launched a similar action. In 2019, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government proposed to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, which, if passed, would allow for extradition requests from authorities in mainland China, Taiwan, and Macau for criminal suspects. Being proposed at a time when the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement was getting more and more intense, the law amendment, which would send Hongkongers to China, the sovereign master of Hong Kong and an authoritarian state lacking the rule of law, evoked a great fear in Hong Kong society that political rights and civil liberties in the city would further deteriorate. Without a democratically elected legislature, Hongkoners had no choice but resort to street activism. 1.03 million and 2 million people took to the street on 9 and 21 June 2019 to make a vocal rejection of the law amendment. These peaceful and non-violent demonstrations however did not receive any positive response from the HKSAR government. Young protesters therefore decided to storm the Legislative Complex on 1 July 2019, trying to force the government to withdraw the law amendment. As in Taiwan, this relatively violent break-in action did not receive much condemnation from the local society—except criticisms from pro-Beijing media and politicians—because it was broadly perceived as an action trying to push the adamant HKSAR government heed public opinion and resist the political intrusion of the authoritarian, Communist China.

With the above details in mind, it is not difficult to see the differences between the two cases in East Asia and the protest in the US. The tactics of these occupy actions might look the same, but their nature is totally different. While protests in Hong Kong and Taiwan aimed to defend civil rights and liberties and counter the political and economic sway of Communist China, the pro-Trump rally was an attempt to overturn the result of a democratic presidential election—a result that has been endorsed by courts in the US. Coinciding with the arrest of 53 pro-democracy activists, legislators and supporters in Hong Kong, the protest in the US Capitol rendered 6 January 2021 one of the darkest days in the history of democracy [2]. Equally important, the case reminds us that it is crucial to understand the causes and claims of different protests so that we can make contextualized comparisons and avoid producing myths in popular narratives that would lend leverage to anti-democracy voices.

Inside the Legislative Complex on 1 July 2019 (1). Photo courtesy: Stand News

Inside the Legislative Complex on 1 July 2019 (2). Words on the paper (top right): “Payment is in the basket.” Words on the paper (bottom right): “We are not thieves and we paid for the drinks.”

[1] https://twitter.com/willripleyCNN/status/1346945349315747841

[2] It is widely believed that the mass arrest, which was made in the name of the National Security Law legislated by the Beijing government last year to arrest the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, was well-crafted to avoid international attention since all media focuses were put on the ratifying process of the US presidential election result on this day.