文革風風向

以往經常會看到這類新聞：

//香港惠州社團聯合總會昨日舉行規模龐大的「反佔中」萬人盆菜宴，筵開1100席，1.3萬名市民共聚上水河上鄉，齊聲反對違法亂紀的「佔領中環」行動。//

//九龍東區各界聯會舉辦的《基本法》研討會，飲食環節佔了大部分時間，真正討論政改約半小時，由政制及內地事務局長譚志源發言以及答問環節，3 條提問都是來自主家席，問及公民提名、佔中和泛民主派到上海談政改。提問完結後大家拍手，譚志源和觀塘區議會主席陳振彬亦陸續離開，之後在場者全程進食，現場雖有15 個基本法展板及政改單張，但沒有人離開座位駐足觀看。//

//民建聯昨午在華貴邨社區會堂舉行政改座談會，聲稱收集政改民意，更請到梁愛詩、周融做主講嘉賓，可是論壇安排卻與收集民意背道而馳。現場約300名長者、街坊，似為民建聯預早安排的「自己友」。為防傳媒及公眾提出尖銳問題，一度「封館」禁止傳媒在場。//

以往我們會當笑話般看，恥笑政府和建制派打龍通搞活動自撐，或者恥笑他們搞飲飲食食活動收買人心。我不斷在想，他們明知這類活動這樣廢，又明知會支持他們的一定會支持他們，那為何還要花錢花人力物力搞，還要派高官、親中大人物出席？一個解釋是他們要製造民意。另一個解釋就是他們是要透過這類活動向上頭交數。上頭，即中央政府。他們覺得這樣可以交數，是因為中央政府山高皇帝遠，不知這些活動有名無實。

不過今時不同往日了，上頭終於知道你班契弟hea搞，現在開宗名義「不橡皮圖章，不要忠誠廢物」。「忠誠廢物」所指的，應該不局限於黃定光或梁志祥這類開會瞓覺或連議事規則都不懂的個別廢人 ，而是泛指建制派不能再只做有名無實的垃圾活動。以後爭取人心的工作要認真搞，不能只在數簿上報人頭交差了事。

「忠誠廢物」論之所以重要，不是因為我們可以坐定定食花生睇建制派內部自鬥，而是因為這意味著文革風終於開始由針對政府內部、民主派頭目及曾表態的知名人士，吹到民間日常生活層面。因為建制派要鬥紅鬥忠誠，必定會開始用更高壓、更強迫性的方式「爭取」支持，動員大眾。這種動員，相信不會止於以往周融式簽名活動吧。香港人的背部骨質健康程度，真正考驗來了。

沒有恐懼的理由

 一直以來，我都不認為中共政權近年（即2014年後）的對港政策是經過仔細計算得出來的周詳計劃，而是因應國內、外形勢，以及香港本土力量掘起而見步行步得出來的結果。與其討論中共政權如何透過監禁和監控去為香港社會製造恐懼，不如討論中共自身的恐懼。

恐懼在政治行動中是雙面刃。對民間社會行動者來說，恐懼會令人對集體行動卻步，而克服恐懼則是參與行動的最低門檻。對當權者來說，恐懼社會變革及失去權力會令他們加大力度打壓，但同時又可能間接製造社會變革的契機。例如社會學者Jack Barbalet的研究便指出，在第一次世界大戰期間及之後的英國，英國政府因為懼怕急速掘起的工人階級力量，所以逐步將工會分子納入體制，讓他們參與決策，平息激進工人運動。這一舉動看似是「行政吸納政治」，但確實令工人薪酬及福利保障得到提升，而選舉權亦得以擴大。

回到今天的中國，可以令當權者恐懼的事多的是。先不計香港、新彊的反對力量。經濟下行（詳見孔誥烽教授的多篇分析）、中美關係、中共內部權鬥等等，都足以令決策者（數到最後，即習近平本人）做出看似合理但其實錯誤的決定。我們當然不能用上述英國的正面例子直接比較，畢竟會否出現正面的結果必定取決於很多未知因素。但重點是，社會/政治行動之所以值得研究，是因為它們除了有我們眼所能見的後果（manifest effect），亦必定有隱藏的後果（latent effect）或不經意的後果（unintended consequence），所以會創造出一個又一個的轉折點（critical juncture）。例如近日傳出的選舉制度改革的新聞，隨時大大削弱民建聯的力量（詳見林輝的分析）。將來沒有了民建聯的蛇齋餅糭和地區動員，有誰敢肯定選舉制度改革一定有利當權者的長治久安？比賽一日未完，一日都未知最後結果呢。

處身極權社會及鬥爭年代，重點是調整希望的timescale（這一點我之前說過，但錯手delete左個post）。我們不要期望一些眼所能見的效果，也不要執著計算每一個行動的成功率，因為這些東西現在都變成unforeseeable，做好當下最immediate可以做的事，就是最好的處世方式。只要你還有自己的崗位，就在該崗位努力，那怕只是令一個人由藍轉黃，那怕只是自己真誠磊落地做人，那怕只是將自己的子女教育成有尊嚴的人。我肯定有些人會很看不起（或者嚴重誤解）everyday resistance的意義和力量，但做好自己範疇的事，對於整場抗爭運動即使不是sufficient condition，也是necessary condition。何桂藍可以在法院內腰板挺直，其實每個人每日在每個生活範疇都可以。

對家而家驚到瀨屎瀨尿，我地有乜好恐懼？有乜需要失去希望？

搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣的

轉不轉mewe？用不用signal？我個人好港豬好隨波逐流好無主見，跟大隊大家用乜就用乜。我向來唔會放太多嘢喺facebook，兩袖清風；whatsapp也從不backup data，要搬就搬。無所謂的原因，不是因為視mewe / signal為應許之地，而是因為我覺得，搬到哪裡，都是一樣。正確點說，搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣。

我相信大部分人思考是否轉場，都有起碼三個考慮：1) 平台是否獨立自主、2) 去中心化、3) 私隱保障。

關於1：很多人都視一個獨立自主而且非牟利的網絡平台為應許之地，十多年前的facebook就是如此。問題是，當一個平台開始擴張，甚至變成跨國企業，就會開始滲透著不少政治和經濟元素。但反過來，如果一個平台長期保持獨立自主而且非牟利，它的生存能力又有多持久？影響力又可以去到多闊？我想，獨立自主而且非牟利的網絡平台的確是存在的，但要數一個生命力強又有聚眾能力的平台，我想不出有哪個（連登這例子仍有待觀察）。因此，大家可以想像，若干年後的mewe，可能也會變成今日的facebook。網絡平台這回事，搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣。

關於2：一個有聚眾能力的平台是否能夠做到完完全全的去中心化，我本身就有懷疑。正如一個facebook page，一個網絡KOL的意見，本身就是一種具大台型態的東西。當然，在商業化的網絡世界下，很多企業及政治人物可以花錢在網絡上帶風向，影響輿論。因此，去中心化這個問題，很取決於用家的自省能力。如果你滿足於網絡世界內的echo chamber effect，那麼搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣的。

關於3：對於很多人來說，用一個網絡平台或手機app，只要私隱條款不是太過份，也不會太在意，畢竟這是方便性與私隱之間的取捨。因此，私隱保障這個問題，其實也很視乎用家的自省能力及敏感度。如開首所言，我向來不會放太多東西於網絡上，有時甚至會用一個鬼email account登錄某些網站。但如果你是一個乜鳩都擺上網的人，那麼沒有甚麼網絡平台是絕對安全的。最近有人指出mewe的私隱條款其實比facebook也不是好很多，所以大家不要期望在商業世界內，有私隱度百分百安全這回事，所以搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣的。

那麼轉場的真正原因又是甚麼呢？於我來說，轉場的本質就是一場消費者運動。一間企業（corporation）之所以是企業，是因為它既有富可敵國的財力，又有影響眾生的能力。但消費者仍可以vote by feet、運用其力量作良心消費，推動企業對社會負責（亦即corporate social responsibility）。當然，如果你從一個極品級左膠的角度出發，你一定會覺得推動企業負社會責任本身不能改變資本主義一分一毫，是沒有意義的。但消費者運動最重要的影響力，在於它可以告訴企業巨鯨，we are watching you，咪諗住亂來。

總括來說，不要期望商業化的網絡世界有甚麼應許之地。世界有太多二元對立，但事實是：地球上沒有用這個等於藍，用那個等於黃：也沒有用這個等於不安全，用那個等於安全。重點始終是用家本身對於網絡世界的反思能力，以及對網絡安全的敏感度。

而最最最重要的，其實是即使老大哥在現實/網絡世界監察著你，你有沒有那份有乜講乜，說出真相的勇氣。如果你無，那麼搬到哪裡，都是一撚樣的。

Can we compare the occupy action in the US Capitol with those in Hong Kong and Taiwan?

Violent clashes with police, storming the legislature, vandalizing properties in the parliamentary building …… All these happened in the United States, one of the most well-established democratic states in the world. The event in the US Capitol shocked the world and an interesting narrative followed. Messages from Chinese netizens flooded the Internet, trying to discredit the overall desirability of democracy and accusing Western media and politicians of upholding a “double standard.” They proclaimed, whereas the Western world blamed pro-Trump protesters as “mobs,” it praised activists in Hong Kong who broke into the legislature in 2019 as “democratic fighters.” This comparison is at once intriguing and confusing. Even CNN international correspondent, Will Ripley, made a similar tweet in Twitter [1]. In order to determine whether these claims are justified, let us first review two earlier occupy protests occurring in 2014 and 2019. 

The first case that needs to be reviewed is the Taiwanese Sunflower Movement in 2014. Since the rise of the Chinese economy in the early 2000s, the Beijing government has been using its economic power to entice Taiwan to establish a closer relation with mainland China—first economically and then politically. With the change of the ruling party of Taiwan from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party to the pro-unification Nationalist Party in 2008, a free trade pact, Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), was signed between the Beijing and Taipei governments in 2010 and the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) was added under ECFA in June 2013. Worried by the potential economic co-optation by an authoritarian state and angered by the lack of transparency in the local legislative process, Taiwanese student activists stormed the Legislative Yuan in March 2014 and occupied the building. Despite the relatively confrontational tactic, the occupation received widespread support from the Taiwanese society since the activists had exhausted all sorts of peaceful means before undertaking the break-in action. Having occupied the parliament for 24 days, the action successfully forced the Nationalist government to put the CSSTA on hold and safeguarded the corrosion of democracy in Taiwan. 

Five years after the Sunflower Movement, activists in Hong Kong learned the tactic from their Taiwanese counterparts and launched a similar action. In 2019, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government proposed to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, which, if passed, would allow for extradition requests from authorities in mainland China, Taiwan, and Macau for criminal suspects. Being proposed at a time when the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement was getting more and more intense, the law amendment, which would send Hongkongers to China, the sovereign master of Hong Kong and an authoritarian state lacking the rule of law, evoked a great fear in Hong Kong society that political rights and civil liberties in the city would further deteriorate. Without a democratically elected legislature, Hongkoners had no choice but resort to street activism. 1.03 million and 2 million people took to the street on 9 and 21 June 2019 to make a vocal rejection of the law amendment. These peaceful and non-violent demonstrations however did not receive any positive response from the HKSAR government. Young protesters therefore decided to storm the Legislative Complex on 1 July 2019, trying to force the government to withdraw the law amendment. As in Taiwan, this relatively violent break-in action did not receive much condemnation from the local society—except criticisms from pro-Beijing media and politicians—because it was broadly perceived as an action trying to push the adamant HKSAR government heed public opinion and resist the political intrusion of the authoritarian, Communist China.

With the above details in mind, it is not difficult to see the differences between the two cases in East Asia and the protest in the US. The tactics of these occupy actions might look the same, but their nature is totally different. While protests in Hong Kong and Taiwan aimed to defend civil rights and liberties and counter the political and economic sway of Communist China, the pro-Trump rally was an attempt to overturn the result of a democratic presidential election—a result that has been endorsed by courts in the US. Coinciding with the arrest of 53 pro-democracy activists, legislators and supporters in Hong Kong, the protest in the US Capitol rendered 6 January 2021 one of the darkest days in the history of democracy [2]. Equally important, the case reminds us that it is crucial to understand the causes and claims of different protests so that we can make contextualized comparisons and avoid producing myths in popular narratives that would lend leverage to anti-democracy voices.

Inside the Legislative Complex on 1 July 2019 (1). Photo courtesy: Stand News

Inside the Legislative Complex on 1 July 2019 (2). Words on the paper (top right): “Payment is in the basket.” Words on the paper (bottom right): “We are not thieves and we paid for the drinks.”

[1] https://twitter.com/willripleyCNN/status/1346945349315747841

[2] It is widely believed that the mass arrest, which was made in the name of the National Security Law legislated by the Beijing government last year to arrest the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, was well-crafted to avoid international attention since all media focuses were put on the ratifying process of the US presidential election result on this day.