反送中抗惡法運動來到這一刻,惡法未撤,人民不退。在這時候,不妨來一個中期回顧,在6.26及7.1兩次大型行動之前,檢討得失,展望將來。
歷史里程碑:
1. 6.9和6.16兩次大遊行,人數高達103萬及200 + 1萬人,打破了八九六四及零三七一的遊行人數紀錄,成為香港史上最大型的政治運動,其歷史意義相信不需要我多解釋。
2. 五月的真假法案委員會爭議,泛民團結一致以「繼續開會」行動回應專(建)制派及立法會秘書處無法無天地將石禮謙送上「主席」位。從政治文化角度言,那次行動的意義,在於泛民終於有勇氣打破虛擬自由主義之下的虛擬議會及虛擬遊戲規則,首次以人民之名及人民之實進行立法會會議。
3. 今次運動是繼陳毓祥在保釣運動身亡後,首次有人因為抗爭而死。與1996年那次不同的是,保釣是愛國運動,反送中抗惡法是反中、本土運動。另一不同的是,那次是意外,今次是抗爭者是為了運動目標本身以死相諫。回顧本地抗爭史,90年代的本土運動試過兩次(i.e. 石湖新村抗爭及荃灣天台屋抗爭)嘗試點燃石油氣以死相脅,但畢竟只是擺擺姿態,沒有來真。即使是在本土運動的火紅70年代,記憶中亦沒有出現同類抗爭模式(有心人可以再fact check)。今次義士犧牲的震懾力,在於勾起一股無分左中右的大眾情緒:悲憤。以悲憤作為運動的道德基礎及動員手段,是八九六四後首見,其動員威力在616大遊行可見一斑。
4. 前日包圍黑警總部,是繼2009年反高鐵快樂抗爭及2012年反國教大絕食之後,(我認為)攻擊力最強而又能保持和理非的行動。抗爭者憤怒而不狂躁,勇武而不躁動,這正正是對狂暴黑警最大的羞辱。怒屌而不亂衝,充分顯示抗爭者的克制和智慧。或者徐克拍完《智取威虎山》,不妨考慮一下拍一部《智取黑警穴》。另外,不得不提的是,另一個和理非得來又威力無窮的行動,當然是sing hallelujah to the lord了。這些行動在在說明,勇武和和理非並非對立,而是可以完美及有機地結合一體。
延續與轉化:
1. 到目前為止,特區政府未有讓步意圖,用對付雨傘運動的同一模式,以消耗戰來對付反送中運動。當然,這和呂秉權在《明報》文章〈修逃犯例——你要知的「習近平對港全景圖」(上)〉所提及習近平的治港方針有關。他引述習近平在2013年在「十八屆中央政治局第四次集體學習」的講話:「要引導全體人民遵守法律,有問題依靠法律來解決,決不能讓那種大鬧大解決、小鬧小解決、不鬧不解決現象蔓延開來,否則還有什麼法治可言呢?」可見,以「以法治國」仍然是對付示威的大方向。當然,這個「法」只是為政權服務,而且不會輕易後退。林鄭和鄭若樺道歉,自然只是針對個人的技術性失誤,而非政策調整。
2. 與2014年不同的是,今次香港的抗爭得到更多的國際關注和支持。這種支持不再是lip service,而是真的有可能在中美貿易戰的大環境下成為實質支持。2014年時,佔領者曾經寄望11月的APEC會議可能為運動帶來轉機,但最終甚麼也沒有發生。今年六月的G20會議同樣是爭取國際支持的關鍵時機,Trump已表示可能向習總提香港問題,且看626的大吹雞能否逼Trump真正打出香港牌。
3. 就行動模式而言,如果2014年的關鍵詞是「佔領」,今次運動的關鍵詞則是「流動」。簡單點說,就是前天抗爭者掛在口邊的「Be water」。這幾星期黑警的行動明顯是要殺盡所有大規模佔領的苗頭,同時抗爭者亦深明大規模佔領可能令民意反彈,所以佔領不再是可行之法,而取而代之的是機動堵路及遍地開花式不合作運動,例如612警民大衝突後的短暫佔領畢打街、616的小規模佔領夏愨道、逼地鐵行動、死火行動、621包圍黑警總部、以及當日辦公時間堵塞稅務大樓、入境事務大樓及政府合署。上述行動既是在黑警嚴密佈防下間接促成,亦是在「流動」的新行動邏輯下出現。這種新行動邏輯,一方比傘運時的鳩嗚團更具延續性及組織力,同時亦避免了警方的大規模攻擊及民意上的反彈,為日後政治行動提供重要參考。
行動方向:
我個人較為離地,所以戰述事宜留給前線抗爭者、連登仔及勇武派思考,以下集中討論論述及修辭(rhetoric)層面
1. 泛民主派一向不擅長製造貼地的論述,或用貼地的修辭向大眾解釋理念和行動。相反,專(建)制派則是這方面的能手。一個建立入屋話語的方法,就是將主流或對手的話語「據為己有、拿為己用」(appropriation)。可能是基於(無謂的)道德堅持,泛民從來不會這樣做,而只不斷重覆一般(偏藍)市民不會知你嗡乜春的「法治」、「公義」、「核心價值」等話語。舉個例,目前「黑警」和「警暴」兩套修辭已經較傘運或魚蛋事件時成功入屋,但對一般(偏藍)市民來說,可能仍會覺得是你班示威者抵死或示威者挑釁在先。更好的話語方式,是挪用專(建)制派及政府由朝講到晚的「守法」修辭,以「犯法」及其他類似字眼直接套用於譴責黑警暴行之上,突顯「執法」之不當正正在於其「違法」,而不單單止是過份暴力。因為暴力是相對的,可以人言人殊,但違法與否則有相對清晰的界線,能直接地引起一般市民關於黑警的印/想像。
2. 2003年七一之後的區議會選舉,泛民成功令專(建)制派大敗而言,但由於輕視地區工作,幾年之後專(建)制派完全收復失地。今年11月區議會選舉臨近,可以預期泛民會較上次區選成功,但如何避免當年的錯,就是應該由現在開始,將「反惡法 = 爭普選」的論述,在社區內落地生根。相信沒有人比14年後在社區工作的傘兵更明白這項任務的重要性和迫切性了。
3. 最後,每出一次政治post都要講一次,請不要再叫建制派做「建制派」,而是「專制派」,要由這一刻開始叫,一直叫到11月區議會選舉。「建制」在香港的語境是中性,「專制」才能真正突顯這班奴才的特徵,更重要的是將「建制派」在一般市民心目中「建設」的形象置換為「專橫霸道」。正如專制派會叫民主派做「反對派」,道理其實是一樣的。一字之差,media framing的效果可以差天共地。689和777的例子說明,政治行動的第一步,是幫對家改個好名﹗
《立場新聞》轉載:
https://thestandnews.com/politics/%E5%8F%8D%E9%80%81%E4%B8%AD%E9%81%8B%E5%8B%95%E7%9A%84%E6%AD%B7%E5%8F%B2%E6%84%8F%E7%BE%A9-%E8%A1%8C%E5%8B%95%E6%A8%A1%E5%BC%8F%E8%88%87%E6%9C%AA%E4%BE%86%E6%96%B9%E5%90%91/
2019年6月22日 星期六
反引渡條例運動前路
此文寫於2019年6月16日:
黑警選擇唔清場,說明政府再一次想靠打消耗戰,所以我地必須汲取傘運教訓,以免流失民意:
1. 雖然人數已達200萬,但香港地,港豬多,必須立即落區,說明不完全撤回的後果,以免公眾對運動拖長產生厭惡
2. 因為黑警暴力及烈士犧牲,民意已一面倒傾向運動,要留住大多數,就要「和理非」,我們不需用憤怒,亦不需將運動快樂抗爭化,目前的悲憤作為社會主流情感,是前六四後前所未見的,這種情感就是運動的道德基礎,正如鄺神話齋,不要我們做先動手一方,而是要用溫柔對抗暴力
3. 但運動必須盡早升級,民陣必須盡快重提三罷,用目前小規模佔領的空間爭取時間,令林鄭一星期之內(目標依難度排列):撤法、撤暴動定性、查黑警、撤被補人士控罪、問責下台,否則23日再大遊行,然後該星期啟動三罷,到七一再大規模動員
4. 進一步而言,在論述層面上,應著手建構「反惡法 = 爭取普選」的關係
5. 每出一次政治post都要講一次,唔好再叫建制派做「建制派」,係「專制派」,要由呢一刻開始叫,叫到11月區議會選舉
運動要贏,就必須汲取傘運教訓,運動節奏、運動的形象面貌、戰述的多樣性要掌握得更好。
黑警選擇唔清場,說明政府再一次想靠打消耗戰,所以我地必須汲取傘運教訓,以免流失民意:
1. 雖然人數已達200萬,但香港地,港豬多,必須立即落區,說明不完全撤回的後果,以免公眾對運動拖長產生厭惡
2. 因為黑警暴力及烈士犧牲,民意已一面倒傾向運動,要留住大多數,就要「和理非」,我們不需用憤怒,亦不需將運動快樂抗爭化,目前的悲憤作為社會主流情感,是前六四後前所未見的,這種情感就是運動的道德基礎,正如鄺神話齋,不要我們做先動手一方,而是要用溫柔對抗暴力
3. 但運動必須盡早升級,民陣必須盡快重提三罷,用目前小規模佔領的空間爭取時間,令林鄭一星期之內(目標依難度排列):撤法、撤暴動定性、查黑警、撤被補人士控罪、問責下台,否則23日再大遊行,然後該星期啟動三罷,到七一再大規模動員
4. 進一步而言,在論述層面上,應著手建構「反惡法 = 爭取普選」的關係
5. 每出一次政治post都要講一次,唔好再叫建制派做「建制派」,係「專制派」,要由呢一刻開始叫,叫到11月區議會選舉
運動要贏,就必須汲取傘運教訓,運動節奏、運動的形象面貌、戰述的多樣性要掌握得更好。
The Umbrella Movement 2.0: The 2019 Anti-Extradition Protest in Hong Kong
This article was written on 13/6/2019:
In September 2014, hundreds of thousands of protesters in Hong Kong went onto the street, standing up against the Chinese National People’s Congress’s decision to bar Hong Kong from having a free and fair universal suffrage. Protesters occupied the roads around the Hong Kong government headquarters and confronted the police. After a tense day of stand-off, the police fired tear gas at the protester. The strategy to disperse the protesters, however, backfired and provoked mass anger among Hongkongers. Enraged by the police’s excessive use of violence, over a million ordinary citizens turned up and joined the protest, thereby producing the historic Umbrella Movement. The Beijing government, Hong Kong’s sovereign master, nevertheless, stayed adamant and refused to give in. No fruitful outcome was achieved and the protesters’ goal to strive for universal suffrage failed. Yet on the last day of occupation, a big banner was left on the occupied zone, which wrote: “We Will be Back.”
Five years later, the Hong Kong protesters, once again, besieged the government headquarters. This time, the protesters were fighting against a controversial extradition bill with China. On 9 June 2019, 1.03 million people from all walks of life marched on the street to voice their disagreement with the bill. Yet the Hong Kong government refused to withdraw the bill and even tried to push for passing it before July, forcing the protesters to escalate their action. Three days later, the day to start the second reading of the bill in the Legislative Council, tens of thousands of protesters, who are mostly at their early 20s, seized control of the area around the government headquarters. However, they succeeded only temporarily. Compared to the Umbrella Movement, the policing strategy was a lot tougher this time. Not only tear gas but also plastic bullets were fired. Trying to stop another large-scale occupy movement from happening, the Hong Kong police attacked protesters and even journalists aggressively. The protesters had no choice but to retreat to some narrow streets. So far, more than 70 protesters were injured and some of them were in serious condition.
Despite increasing police violence, many youngsters still choose to stand in the frontline. Many of them see it as a desperate fight against the authoritarian Chinese government. As some of them call it, this is an endgame. What makes the young protesters feel the hopelessness and urgency to make the last roar? Over the past five years, political rights and civil liberties in Hong Kong have been on a rapid decline. In 2015, a local bookseller who sells books critical of the Chinese leaders was abducted and detained in China. In 2016, Edward Leung, a pro-independence young activist, was barred from running in the Legislative Council election because of his political stance. In 2017, six pro-democracy and pro-independence legislators were removed from their posts after the Beijing government unusually re-interpreted the Basic Law, the mini-constitution of Hong Kong, and claimed that the oaths they made during the commencing ceremony of the new legislative term were unqualified. From 2017 to 2019, several leading activists of the 2014 Umbrella Movement were sentenced to jail. Pro-independence activists, including Edward Leung, who were charged with initiating a “riot” in 2016, faced the same fate and they got a much heavier sentence. Two of them are now forced to seek asylum in Germany. For many Hong Kong people, the city is no longer the one they are familiar with. The proposed legislation of the extradition agreement with China in recent months came to be the last straw.
The extradition bill, formally known as the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance Amendment, was tabled after a Hong Kong man murdered his girlfriend in Taiwan and then returned to Hong Kong last year. Since there has been no extradition agreement between Hong Kong and Taiwan, the Hong Kong government claimed it was a loophole to be plugged. An amendment to the current Fugitive Offenders Ordinance was therefore proposed in February 2019, which would allow for extradition requests from authorities in mainland China, Taiwan, and Macau for criminal suspects. Once the amendment is adopted, anyone, including permanent Hong Kong citizens, businessmen, journalists, and visitors of whatever nationalities, could be accused to have violated Chinese laws in Hong Kong and extradited to China. Since the Chinese government often uses non-political charges to prosecute political dissent, and since there is no fair trial in mainland China, it is deeply worrying that this would pose another great threat to the human rights of Hongkongers. Although the Taiwanese authority has stated its concern about the possibility that Taiwanese citizens in Hong Kong could be extradited to mainland China, and although it is possible for the Hong Kong and Taiwanese governments to make a one-time extradition agreement, the Hong Kong government insisted on pushing forward the current version of amendment. Worse still, the government argued the urgency required to handle the current murder case allowed for only 20 days for public consultation.
Rejecting the extradition bill amendment, the civil society of Hong Kong, which had been low in morale after the failure of the Umbrella Movement, has become vibrant again. The fragmented relationship between the moderate and the radical flanks has been glued. Apart from the demonstration and the occupy action mentioned above, there were 3,000 lawyers, prosecutors, law students, and academics marching in silence to request the government shelve the bill earlier this month. University and secondary school students and alumni, overseas students, and many other civil society groups also started hundreds of petitions to protest against the amendment. More actions are going to be held in coming days, including a creative action to “occupy” the cars of the underground train—a non-cooperative action attempting to paralyze the city without confronting the police directly. Also, more petitions are going on locally and internationally, such as the one to request the U.S, British, and Australian governments to block or reject the visas of the Hong Kong officials and the pro-China legislators—many of whom claim themselves as patriotic, loyal Chinese while holding a second nationality and lots of assets in the West. We do not know what will work, but as Lu Xun, a leading Chinese writer, famously said, “although originally there was no path on the ground, as more and more people walked through, it became a path.”
If you are willing to support us, please join the petition.
If you want to get the latest news, please follow these links:
https://www.facebook.com/HongKongWatch1/?fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser
https://www.facebook.com/hkantiextradition/?fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser
https://www.collaction.hk/discovery/project?q=%E5%8F%8D%E9%80%81%E4%B8%AD&fbclid=IwAR3UUw2pgpaCMEjBJId8QQvx2MwvHfZ0_bpB-aT_Yh2YVWTxqPkth5Q34t8
If you agree with our action, please spread our message far and wide. Monitoring from the international community is the best way to avoid bloodshed in Hong Kong.
In September 2014, hundreds of thousands of protesters in Hong Kong went onto the street, standing up against the Chinese National People’s Congress’s decision to bar Hong Kong from having a free and fair universal suffrage. Protesters occupied the roads around the Hong Kong government headquarters and confronted the police. After a tense day of stand-off, the police fired tear gas at the protester. The strategy to disperse the protesters, however, backfired and provoked mass anger among Hongkongers. Enraged by the police’s excessive use of violence, over a million ordinary citizens turned up and joined the protest, thereby producing the historic Umbrella Movement. The Beijing government, Hong Kong’s sovereign master, nevertheless, stayed adamant and refused to give in. No fruitful outcome was achieved and the protesters’ goal to strive for universal suffrage failed. Yet on the last day of occupation, a big banner was left on the occupied zone, which wrote: “We Will be Back.”
Five years later, the Hong Kong protesters, once again, besieged the government headquarters. This time, the protesters were fighting against a controversial extradition bill with China. On 9 June 2019, 1.03 million people from all walks of life marched on the street to voice their disagreement with the bill. Yet the Hong Kong government refused to withdraw the bill and even tried to push for passing it before July, forcing the protesters to escalate their action. Three days later, the day to start the second reading of the bill in the Legislative Council, tens of thousands of protesters, who are mostly at their early 20s, seized control of the area around the government headquarters. However, they succeeded only temporarily. Compared to the Umbrella Movement, the policing strategy was a lot tougher this time. Not only tear gas but also plastic bullets were fired. Trying to stop another large-scale occupy movement from happening, the Hong Kong police attacked protesters and even journalists aggressively. The protesters had no choice but to retreat to some narrow streets. So far, more than 70 protesters were injured and some of them were in serious condition.
Despite increasing police violence, many youngsters still choose to stand in the frontline. Many of them see it as a desperate fight against the authoritarian Chinese government. As some of them call it, this is an endgame. What makes the young protesters feel the hopelessness and urgency to make the last roar? Over the past five years, political rights and civil liberties in Hong Kong have been on a rapid decline. In 2015, a local bookseller who sells books critical of the Chinese leaders was abducted and detained in China. In 2016, Edward Leung, a pro-independence young activist, was barred from running in the Legislative Council election because of his political stance. In 2017, six pro-democracy and pro-independence legislators were removed from their posts after the Beijing government unusually re-interpreted the Basic Law, the mini-constitution of Hong Kong, and claimed that the oaths they made during the commencing ceremony of the new legislative term were unqualified. From 2017 to 2019, several leading activists of the 2014 Umbrella Movement were sentenced to jail. Pro-independence activists, including Edward Leung, who were charged with initiating a “riot” in 2016, faced the same fate and they got a much heavier sentence. Two of them are now forced to seek asylum in Germany. For many Hong Kong people, the city is no longer the one they are familiar with. The proposed legislation of the extradition agreement with China in recent months came to be the last straw.
The extradition bill, formally known as the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance Amendment, was tabled after a Hong Kong man murdered his girlfriend in Taiwan and then returned to Hong Kong last year. Since there has been no extradition agreement between Hong Kong and Taiwan, the Hong Kong government claimed it was a loophole to be plugged. An amendment to the current Fugitive Offenders Ordinance was therefore proposed in February 2019, which would allow for extradition requests from authorities in mainland China, Taiwan, and Macau for criminal suspects. Once the amendment is adopted, anyone, including permanent Hong Kong citizens, businessmen, journalists, and visitors of whatever nationalities, could be accused to have violated Chinese laws in Hong Kong and extradited to China. Since the Chinese government often uses non-political charges to prosecute political dissent, and since there is no fair trial in mainland China, it is deeply worrying that this would pose another great threat to the human rights of Hongkongers. Although the Taiwanese authority has stated its concern about the possibility that Taiwanese citizens in Hong Kong could be extradited to mainland China, and although it is possible for the Hong Kong and Taiwanese governments to make a one-time extradition agreement, the Hong Kong government insisted on pushing forward the current version of amendment. Worse still, the government argued the urgency required to handle the current murder case allowed for only 20 days for public consultation.
Rejecting the extradition bill amendment, the civil society of Hong Kong, which had been low in morale after the failure of the Umbrella Movement, has become vibrant again. The fragmented relationship between the moderate and the radical flanks has been glued. Apart from the demonstration and the occupy action mentioned above, there were 3,000 lawyers, prosecutors, law students, and academics marching in silence to request the government shelve the bill earlier this month. University and secondary school students and alumni, overseas students, and many other civil society groups also started hundreds of petitions to protest against the amendment. More actions are going to be held in coming days, including a creative action to “occupy” the cars of the underground train—a non-cooperative action attempting to paralyze the city without confronting the police directly. Also, more petitions are going on locally and internationally, such as the one to request the U.S, British, and Australian governments to block or reject the visas of the Hong Kong officials and the pro-China legislators—many of whom claim themselves as patriotic, loyal Chinese while holding a second nationality and lots of assets in the West. We do not know what will work, but as Lu Xun, a leading Chinese writer, famously said, “although originally there was no path on the ground, as more and more people walked through, it became a path.”
If you are willing to support us, please join the petition.
If you want to get the latest news, please follow these links:
https://www.facebook.com/HongKongWatch1/?fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser
https://www.facebook.com/hkantiextradition/?fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser
https://www.collaction.hk/discovery/project?q=%E5%8F%8D%E9%80%81%E4%B8%AD&fbclid=IwAR3UUw2pgpaCMEjBJId8QQvx2MwvHfZ0_bpB-aT_Yh2YVWTxqPkth5Q34t8
If you agree with our action, please spread our message far and wide. Monitoring from the international community is the best way to avoid bloodshed in Hong Kong.
2018年6月2日 星期六
道義責任
如果我身在香港,今年的六四晚會還是會選擇去的,理由其實好簡單:
1. 我知道有不少人會覺得悼念六四不是香港這個共同體的事。但當我知道雨傘運動時,身在極權國度的蘇昌蘭、陳啟棠、王默、謝文飛、張聖雨、梁勤輝、甄江華及很多支援者,因為聲援傘運相繼入獄,或被監控。他們在爭取「自己的國家」的人權自由公義民主的時候,沒有因為香港只是偏遠的南方一隅而選擇對不公義視而不見。如果共產黨是我們的共同敵人的話,那麼去六四晚會,喊結束一黨專政,就是一種道義責任,也是對同路人的道謝。
2. 我知道不少人會覺得現在談六四事件只是鞏固家國情懷(雖然這種說法已被反駁過很多次),但我會仍會強調一點:這種說法對上一輩來說可能是valid,但由我這一輩80後開始肯定不是。我第一次去六四晚會是09年,亦即是反高鐵運動那一年。對我來說,平反六四,跟反高鐵的不公義,從來都是一體兩面的事,而從09、10那兩年六四晚會人數創新高來看,我相信這種說法都apply在他們身上的。因此我相信,年復年爭取平反六四,就是對本土民主運動的另一種參與。
3. 早前讀一篇關於六四事件的英國檔案解密報道,見到報道下面有個留言:「又消費六四情意結」。我驚訝,原本咁都叫消費?唔係fa?對很多人而言,參加六四晚會既然「沒有用」,那只會成為一個幫泛民和支聯會「吸金」的場合。事實上,李卓人何俊仁張文光長毛等等等等,從來沒有因為29年來的六四晚會而變成富豪。相反,不少晚會得來的資金的確是落在中國民運人士手上,發展公民社會。司徙華生前提過,每一封由支聯會寄給在囚民運人士的信,每一年六四晚會的人數,共產黨都會數著。你可以不滿意支聯會這班人做事守舊保守老套,但如果肉眼見不到「功效」,就等於「沒有用」,就等於消費情感,那無疑是對希望政治一個極度狹窄的理解。情感往往依附於一種時間性(temporality),如果你要求一種短期目標的效果論,要證明「因為我參加了六四晚會,而今年的晚會又成功令共產黨削弱了xx%」,這無疑是不切實際,甚至變成一種虛無主義(邏輯上你今晚如常食飯瞓覺,都唔保證你長命百歲的)。但如果我們將時間性拉長一點,對目標的理解闊一點,六四晚會(及其他民主運動的episodes)其實已經發揮了不少肉眼見不到效用。例如09年後年青人政治參與大幅提升,而共產黨的authority亦由爭取認同、統戰,變成赤裸裸的鎮壓,正正反映政權的合法性不斷被削弱。因此我們不應因為覺得「做乜都無用」,而絕望,遠離政治,拒絕理會六四。如果改變對情感的時間性的理解,現在正是希望的開始。
虛無主義是極權統治的最佳戰友。我知道決定了不去晚會的人不會因為我講幾句cliché 的話而改變主意。我失望的不是香港未有民主,共產黨未被推翻,六四未被平反(again,這是情感的時間性的問題),而是發覺原來身邊不少朋友已經慢慢被虛無的氣息包圍。
總辭不總辭?
寫於2017年7月16日。
事旦講幾句:
其實由梁天琦被篩走一刻,整個選舉制度及議會已經失去合法性。先戴個頭盔,其實當時寫過幾句,認為泛民需要集體杯葛選舉。DQ
6只是同一個故事的不同版本。對於杯葛或是總辭,我的原則一樣。
記得當時網上最普遍的批評,和今次相類似,都是說畀建制派橫行無忌呀、加劇貧富懸殊呀、加深官商勾結呀、畀惡法直接通過呀…...乜乜物物。但其實泛民留左喺議會20年,建制派咪一樣橫行無忌?貧富懸殊咪一直加劇?官商勾結咪一樣繼續?布咪一樣照剪?橫洲撥款咪一樣照過?我懷疑下次建制派嘅賤格程度,應該會昇華到喺唔改議事規則下連人數都唔畀點,泛民乜都冇得玩。如果好似區家麟咁話,總辭支持者認為總辭可以激起市民反感抗爭只是「政治科幻小說式的預言」,那總辭反對者期望留守議會可以做到的,其實同幻想都無乜分別。更何況如果惡法將臨,例如臨立會重立的公安條例,當日動員不到的不代表今天動員不到。社會動員有其他結構性因素及大量的contingency(詳見下面),將來的事無人估到,所以總辭支持者 / 反對者在這方面上,當打個和,誰也不能說服誰。
既然原則一樣,那是否應該總辭?今次我的答案是否定的。我頭腦簡單,唔識好似區家麟咁分析10個迷思同楊岳橋咁寫個總辭百科。我純粹諗work定唔work,如下:
當時我提出的集體杯葛選舉與今次的總辭,是兩個很不同的語境。當時被篩走的是政壇當紅炸子雞,而當時梁振英仍未宣佈放棄連任,民間社會仍然有一個相當明顯的同共敵人(我意思是,比「共產黨」這個概念更貼身),可以集中火力對準特首選舉作另一次大型動員。
更何況,「梁天琦事件」本身是一個moral
shock,但moral shock呢啲野,一次就好shock,第二、三次就叫司空見慣、習以為常,憤怒呢種情感,很難作為長久的動員基礎。只要睇下上次梁天琦同今次DQ4事件的集會人數,就知分別。就算總辭,動員能量有限。
過去10多年的社會/政治運動動員,能夠稱很上超大型而持久的,其實都是靠一些極貼身的議題帶起,例如:
反高鐵運動突然爆出個669億呢個數,動員力即時倍增;支撐反國教的,是「你來搞我個仔?!」的恐懼/恐共感;激發雨傘運動的,是對於「純潔」學生被捕及催淚彈的義憤填膺的感覺(如果爭普選真的是上街主因,那麼在學聯罷課期間應該一早已塞爆金鍾)。就算計埋03年,反23條最多是因素之一,其他更重要的因素,其實是民生問題,同埋大家都想狠狠地屌老董同孽瘤一鑊,03年那次場「民主運動」,是事後的建構。
DQ呢件事,對於一般香港人,仍然是「太政治」,太離身,根本不可能有持久的參與,更遑論「由人民監察議會」及「癱瘓議會」。
既然總辭不能確保賬面有賺,那不如保住本錢,用既有資源發掘更多如反高鐵、反國教般的貼身議題,為下一次大型動員打好基礎。請記住,傳統飯民過去的失敗,不是單單的「戀棧議席」,而是他們沒有利用議席給予的本錢搞好政策研究,所以每次對抗政府都只是臨時抱佛腳。餘下的泛民議員應如何分配工作,接收DQ6
+ 1的政策議題、研究成果及論述,才是當下最應討論的問題。
p.s. 其實我有睇開冰球同NHL嘅習慣。冰球有個球例,犯規球員要被罰出場2分鐘甚或5分鐘,在這段時間球隊只能5個打人地6個,有時不小心甚至會4打6。那麼被罰球隊在那段時間就只能靠4個或者3個場區球員縮後,盡量緊貼龍門,用血肉之驅將對方射球擋住。當然在這段時間被失球的機會很高,但守得好的話,就能令對方多花氣力要不段傳波、走位才可以找到射球路線,直至捱到被罰球員返回球場。好彩的話,short-handed
goal(即人數較少下入波)其實也很常見的。
好撚多野做好眼瞓,寫住咁多先
2017年4月3日 星期一
Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Movement Losing Hope
500,000 people demonstration, referendum for universal
suffrage, 79-days Occupy Movement……efforts to fight for democracy in the past
decade or so have not yet paid off. The Chief Executive election of Hong Kong held
on March 26, 2017 remained as a political
game dominated by the power elites, most of whom have direct or indirect
political and economic relationships with the Beijing government. Unlike the past four Chief
Executive elections, the democrats neither boycotted the Beijing-controlled
election nor nominated a candidate to expose the loopholes of the existing
political system. This time, they chose to support a pro-China, and somewhat
anti-democracy, candidate in the name of public opinion.
To understand the
democrats’ weird move, we need to have a brief knowledge about the political
system which has shaped the pro-democracy movement in Hong
Kong over the past two decades. Since the handover of sovereignty
from Britain to China in 1997, Hong Kong
has become the Special Administrative Region of China. The first two Chief
Executives of Hong Kong were elected by the Election Committee (EC), a
committee formed by 800 major political and business figures who purport to
represent the majority view of the Hong Kong
people. As stipulated in the Basic Law, the mini-constitution of Hong Kong written
by the Beijing
government and some pro-Beijing politicians in the 1980s, such undemocratic
setting would ultimately be replaced by one-person-one-vote within 10 years after
the handover. However, the promise has never realized. Through re-interpreting
the Basic Law in 2004 and 2007, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress (NPCSC) of the Beijing government
delayed the progress of democratization and ruled that no universal suffrage
would be held in Hong Kong until 2017. Despite
such promise, the NPCSC has set high threshold for the nominating process of
the Chief Executive election, meaning that such “universal suffrage” could
easily be manipulated by Beijing
and would not be a genuine one. Political reform based on the NPCSC decision
was thus vetoed in 2014 and the Chief Executive election of this year continued
to adopt the previous method of election: a 1200-members EC [1] is going to
decide who is the leader of Hong Kong . Although
some democrats can become a member of the EC under the current institutional
design, their voices are never loud enough to influence the election result [2].
All they can do is to nominate a pro-democracy candidate to make some dissent
voices (like what they did in 2007 and 2012) or use their votes to force the
pro-Beijing candidates to make some concession to the pro-democracy movement.
Capitalizing the
momentum of the 79-days Occupy Movement in 2014 and the growing discontent
towards the Beijing authority in the civil
society, the Hong Kong democrats made a small
breakthrough to obtain more than 300 seats in the EC election last year. Although
this could be a good chance to at least make a stronger democratic claim and advance
the pro-democracy movement, the democrats ruined it all. On the one hand, they
did not come up with a clear goal of what they should do other than stopping
the incumbent Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying, an assertive hardliner and a
pro-Beijing politician, from running for five more years. On the other, they
were obviously unprepared to deal with the landslide support for one of the
Chief Executive candidates, John Tsang Chun-wah, the former Financial Secretary
of the Hong Kong government, in the civil
society.
The success of John
Tsang was unexpected for both the democrats and observers, but it could not be
simply understood as an excellent political spinning project. Instead, it
should be interpreted as a mobilization of political emotions. To compete with
his major contender, Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor [3], the former Chief Secretary
of the government, who was widely perceived as Beijing ’s
favourite, John Tsang popularized himself among the Hong
Kong citizens not so much by a drastically different policy agenda
but by an emotional mobilization. Contrary to Carrie Lam, the image of whom was
often seen as the parallel of Leung Chun-ying, John Tsang presented himself not
only as a benevolent leader but as a good husband, a friendly former fencing
coach, a martial arts lover, and a guy who loves the local, grassroots culture
of Hong Kong . Blurring the line between the
public and the private realms, John Tsang showed the public his “authentic
self”, something people long for in the era in which people no longer trust the
politicians and in which political emotions have increasingly been managed [4]
by the Beijing authority in the name of patriotism. Subverting the conventional
wisdom that politics is dirty among the Hong Kong
citizens, John Tsang’s image was so fresh and friendly that people could not
stop following him.
John Tsang’s play
of political emotions was much more than that. Rightly identified anxiety,
anger, and hatred as the dominant emotional climate [5] of the Hong Kong society over the past few years, John Tsang deployed
“Trust, Hope, Unity” as his campaign slogan. By contrasting the current devastating
socio-political situation of Hong Kong with
the good old days of the early 1990s [6] in his propaganda, John Tsang effectively
manipulated the notion of hope to invoke memory of the past society, a
depoliticized society with rapid economic growth. Yet, it was by no means a
progressive political vision. Scholars of Hong Kong
studies have generally agreed that what apparent political stability and
economic prosperity of the 1990s masked were the unquestioning support
of a neoliberalist market economy and the tacit acceptance of an undemocratic
(but administratively efficient) government. If John Tsang was advocating a
political vision, it was more about bringing Hong Kong
back to an era in which all inconvenient truths were hidden and all people were
economic and apolitical animals than mobilizing people to care about the
political future of the city to fight for a democratic, free, and equal
society. John Tsang’s notion of hope
was about the future, but such future was articulated with an unachievable and
unprogressive past. In a political climate filled with anxiety, anger, and
hatred, nostalgia simply fueled hope. John Tsang’s emotional mobilization
worked extremely well. Just before the election, he achieved a support rate of
over 60% in public opinion poll, almost a double ahead of Carrie Lam.
Hope, an emotion
usually used by the leftist and the liberal, was effectively appropriated by
John Tsang. Confronting anxiety, anger, and hatred, John Tsang provided the Hong Kong people with the subversive emotions of hope,
happiness, and optimism. The Hong Kong people
were once again mobilized and unified [7] like what happened during the 79-days
Occupy Movement in 2014. Yet this time they were not standing for the broader
liberal, democratic goals but a politician who was a core supporter of the
neoliberalist market economy, who has never made any concrete pledge to
democratization, and who was at most a rebel within the pro-establishment camp.
Debates, disputes, and disagreements were haunting the democratic camp in the
past two months. Social cleavage was once again deepened due to diverged
opinions regarding whether the democratic EC members should abstain or vote for
a popular candidate who might never help advancing democracy. At the end, the Hong Kong democrats chose to dance with the devil and
cast their votes to John Tsang in the name of public opinion. Indeed, no matter
which side they choose and no matter who wins the election [8], they have
already lost the heart of the Hong Kong
people. The mainstream public sentiment has already chosen to side with a
pro-establishment political figure rather than the democrats and trusted that
he could bring a better “future”.
Losing hope, the Hong Kong democrats are losing ground. The democrats will
have a hard time to regain the momentum of the pro-democracy movement in coming
years. Perhaps the first and foremost task for them is to learn how to do efficient
emotional work in political mobilization. Anger and hatred have been deployed
for mobilizing democratic campaigns in the past two to three years, but these
two emotions alone have been insufficient to make good impact, as previous
campaigns have repeatedly proven. So what would be the right and effective
emotions for mobilizing successful pro-democracy campaigns? It is time for them
to learn from John Tsang.
[1] The number of EC member was increased from 800 to 1200
in 2012 under the political reform in 2010.
[2] All EC members must go through an election. However,
such election has been tightly controlled by the Beijing
government through its invisible hand in the political and business sectors of
the Hong Kong society. This means most EC
members are likely to be pro-China, allowing the Beijing government to control the Chief
Executive election easily.
[3] Another candidate of the election was Woo Kwok-hing, a retired judge.
[4] Sociologist Arlie Hochschild argues in her book The Managed Heart that emotions have
been more and more falling under the control of capitalist institutions whose
goal is to increase consumption. But the more emotions are being managed, the
more people search for an authentic self and genuine expression of emotions.
[5] This is largely the result of the massive Occupy Movement
in 2014. On the one hand, people who support democratization have become more hostile
to the Beijing authority, the Hong Kong
government, and the Hong Kong police, and
become more worried about the political future of the city. On the other hand,
the powerholders have mobilized even stronger counter-movement to halt
democratization. Social cleavage has been deepened over the past few years and
mutual trust has been declining.
[6] Despite their apparent political dispute over
democratization of Hong Kong, both the British colonial government and the Beijing government had joined to carry out a
political-economic engineering project to make Hong Kong
as prosperous as possible before the handover. For the British colonial
government, they wanted a glorious departure. For the Beijing
government, they wanted a respectable city to celebrate the national political
project of re-gaining the sovereignty of Hong Kong .
Political stability and economic prosperity were hence the two main themes in
the dominant discourses of Hong Kong in the
early 1990s.
[7] It is believed that John Tsang’s supporters come from
three camps: the centralists, the mild democratic supporters, and the mild
pro-China supporters.
[8] At the end, Carrie Lam won the election by securing 777
votes, while John Tsang and Woo Kwok-hing could only manage to obtain 365 votes
and 21 votes respectively. It is interpreted that the Beijing authority has done a lot behind the
scenes to help Carrie Lam to secure her votes.
2017年3月29日 星期三
向曾俊華學習
人老轉數慢,想梳理一下「曾俊華現象」一些有關政治情感的問題,想了幾天還是想不通。只能草草地總結幾點:
1. 所謂政治情感,不單單是公關技巧的問題,亦不是因為你思想不夠精闢敏銳而被政壇騙子蒙騙。情感存在於社會關係中,有其結構性。情感是個人感受到的,亦是屬於社會大眾的。所謂情感,是政治論述、影像及行動產生出來的「後果」,不是單純發自內心的生理「感受」。每個社會有其主流情感,是社會成員共同感受到的。權力關係既影響政治論述及行動,亦塑造主流情感的建構,但主流情感可以被挑戰,製造另類情感。曾俊華過去兩個多月給予香港人的,正是一個透過生產另類情感,挑戰恐懼、焦慮、仇恨等主流情感的政治動員。
2. 社會學家Arlie R.
Hochschild說,我們正身處一個時刻都在「管理情感」的年代。服務員對你笑,不是真心歡迎你,而是透過管理自己的情感和情感表達方式,令你感覺良好,從而增加消費。此邏輯在政治領域同樣適用。在擠眉弄眼的年代,當權者天天對你說國家是在關心你、為你好;要你愛國、對著國旗心情激動。但Hochschild指出,情感愈是被管理,人們便愈追求所謂「真摰」的情感和「發自內心」的舉動。曾俊華比林鄭受歡迎,除了是因為林鄭面目猙獰,更加是因為曾俊華夠「真」。仁慈的劍擊教練、熱愛中國武術、和下屬玩埋一堆、和市民玩「曾.connect」、「曾.心mean」,全都是展示最「曾」一面。
3. 「希望」是曾俊華競選口號其中一個主打重點。現於浸大任教的社會學家Jack
M. Barbalet指出,情感往往與回憶及過去經驗扣連,從而指導未來的行動方向。「希望」之所以成功動員群眾,除了是對比起當下的恐懼、焦慮、仇恨所產生出來的效果,亦是因為重新勾起在90年代香港出現的一系列美好(但回歸後一直未能落實的)想像:繁榮安定、社會穩定、遠離政治(而前設僅是有一個正正常常、循規蹈矩的政府及官僚架構)。曾俊華所說的「休養生息」,換個說法就是90年代的「維持現狀」。還是杜sir的話夠精警:「未來要睇到嘅和諧嘅香港……為未來三十年好好地建立番一個我地由細到大,只有希望嘅香港」。這個香港,其實就是90年代只管經濟發展、去政治化的香港社會。今天社會、政治烏煙瘴氣的環境下,90年代再次成為香港人對未來的寄託,而「曾俊華」就好像一個empty
signifier,讓大家將所有美好想像通通投射進去,團結香港人。
4. 我們不難理解為何一班進步左派會看這場選戰看到咬牙切齒。「希望」本是他們的「專用主打」情感,這次卻被一個新自由主義者、建制派中人挪用,而玩得有聲有色,出神入化,做到不少社運都做不到的動員效果。如何向曾俊華學習,奪回對「希望」的發言權,導向進步、民主自由的方向,必然成為一眾民主派、左派的新難題。在此搬字過紙,引用幾篇文章談過的幾個觀點。雖然聽起來無甚新意,但希望拋磚引玉,刺激思考社會運動如何重奪情感動員的主導權。
Ron Aminzade及Doug
McAdam在一篇討論情感與社會運動的文章中指出,憤怒必須結合希望才能成功動員群眾。至於如何燃起希望,主要有以下幾點:
4a. 廣義的文化轉向,令人憧憬改變未來,造就社運形成,例如近年香港年青人的後物質價值轉向,造就多場大大小小的社會行動。但文化轉變不是一朝一夕形成,要深耕細作,才能改變主導文化話語權。例如梁啟智博士日前發表的「對抗林鄭行動綱領」所言,胡官也不是一早懂得談棕土,而是靠多個民間團體近年的努力才能帶起議題。因此,還是老套那句,要有希望,首先是不要絕望。深耕細作,自有回報。
4b. 政治機會的出現,是指既有政治版圖中的權力移位,為社會運動員帶來較大空間,令公民社會感覺到一絲取勝希望。雖然在港式精英分裂中,建制派的內部矛盾往往會隨著中央一鎚定音而火速歸位,令民主派拉攏部分商界的希望瞬間幻滅。但社會學家Jack
M. Barbalet提到,恐懼不只局限於缺乏權力的人,手握權力的人有時亦會因恐懼(elite
fear),怕自己既有地位動搖,而作出制度性的變革。商界在5年前梁振英上台時所出現的反彈,正好說明這種情緒。雖然本地商界與中共/紅色資本的裂痕會否進一步加深並非民主派能完全控制的事,但我們或者可以透過行動,讓本地商界體會封閉的政治制度及其衍生的官商勾結,會令其自食其果。例如幫襯小店、罷買四大地產商旗下的所有貨/樓,逼他們親嘗自己種下的惡果,變相拉攏/逼使他們成為民主運動一分子。這些都是我們能做的一小步。
4c. 累積每場小勝利的能量。雖然民主運動至今未成功,但由03七一計起,公民社會「贏粒糖」的次數也不少:利東街運動的由下而上重建方案、藍屋保育、菜園村成功爭取的集體搬村、雨傘運動中首次逼使政府對話…….雖然這些真的只是「小」勝利,但重提這些事件既不是失敗主義,亦不是打飛機自我安慰。須知道,即使成功如美國民權運動,也不是一朝一夕就完全改變不公平的社經制度。公民社會不需要妄自菲薄,因為「希望」的底氣就是從過去的小勝仗中積累出來的,重點是如何包裝和策略性運用這些資源。
5. 仇恨是過去兩、三年公民社會用來動員的主要情感。正如社會學家Helena
Flam所言,當一個政體愈來愈封閉,仇恨作為動員的情感機會就愈大。但Flam亦指到,動員社運的情感可以由不同情感組合而成,帶來不同的動員效果和行動模式。世上沒有必勝的情感動員formula,學術研究不是包生仔。曾俊華選戰的成功,正正提醒我們,要檢視當下香港人不同的情感經驗和各種情感組合的可能性。如果大家recall一下看曾俊華宣傳片的經驗,相信都有一面看,一面會心微笑的時刻。今天,我們是否應重新檢視快樂抗爭的可能性及其能量?快樂又如何可以和信心、樂觀及希望等情感結合,產生不同的動員力。我只是想說,我們既不需摒棄憤怒和仇恨,也不需將快樂抗爭等同和理非非。我們不應過份標榜或污名化某一情感,因為成功的社運動員需要不同情感組合。例如雨運頭十多日的強大動員能力,正正是憤怒、仇恨、希望、快樂、樂觀、恐懼的有機組合。雨運最終的失敗,不是簡單的退場與否的問題,而是未能隨著形勢轉變而改變情感動員的模式,讓一、兩種情感(e.g.
憤怒、仇恨)過份主導,令運動逐漸失去本來擁有動員能力。
(轉載於《立場新聞》,題為「「曾俊華現象」背後的政治情感動員
」:https://www.thestandnews.com/politics/%E6%9B%BE%E4%BF%8A%E8%8F%AF%E7%8F%BE%E8%B1%A1-%E8%83%8C%E5%BE%8C%E7%9A%84%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB%E6%83%85%E6%84%9F%E5%8B%95%E5%93%A1/)
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