The Umbrella Movement 2.0: The 2019 Anti-Extradition Protest in Hong Kong

This article was written on 13/6/2019:

In September 2014, hundreds of thousands of protesters in Hong Kong went onto the street, standing up against the Chinese National People’s Congress’s decision to bar Hong Kong from having a free and fair universal suffrage. Protesters occupied the roads around the Hong Kong government headquarters and confronted the police. After a tense day of stand-off, the police fired tear gas at the protester. The strategy to disperse the protesters, however, backfired and provoked mass anger among Hongkongers. Enraged by the police’s excessive use of violence, over a million ordinary citizens turned up and joined the protest, thereby producing the historic Umbrella Movement. The Beijing government, Hong Kong’s sovereign master, nevertheless, stayed adamant and refused to give in. No fruitful outcome was achieved and the protesters’ goal to strive for universal suffrage failed. Yet on the last day of occupation, a big banner was left on the occupied zone, which wrote: “We Will be Back.”

Five years later, the Hong Kong protesters, once again, besieged the government headquarters. This time, the protesters were fighting against a controversial extradition bill with China. On 9 June 2019, 1.03 million people from all walks of life marched on the street to voice their disagreement with the bill. Yet the Hong Kong government refused to withdraw the bill and even tried to push for passing it before July, forcing the protesters to escalate their action. Three days later, the day to start the second reading of the bill in the Legislative Council, tens of thousands of protesters, who are mostly at their early 20s, seized control of the area around the government headquarters. However, they succeeded only temporarily. Compared to the Umbrella Movement, the policing strategy was a lot tougher this time. Not only tear gas but also plastic bullets were fired. Trying to stop another large-scale occupy movement from happening, the Hong Kong police attacked protesters and even journalists aggressively. The protesters had no choice but to retreat to some narrow streets. So far, more than 70 protesters were injured and some of them were in serious condition.

Despite increasing police violence, many youngsters still choose to stand in the frontline. Many of them see it as a desperate fight against the authoritarian Chinese government. As some of them call it, this is an endgame. What makes the young protesters feel the hopelessness and urgency to make the last roar? Over the past five years, political rights and civil liberties in Hong Kong have been on a rapid decline. In 2015, a local bookseller who sells books critical of the Chinese leaders was abducted and detained in China. In 2016, Edward Leung, a pro-independence young activist, was barred from running in the Legislative Council election because of his political stance. In 2017, six pro-democracy and pro-independence legislators were removed from their posts after the Beijing government unusually re-interpreted the Basic Law, the mini-constitution of Hong Kong, and claimed that the oaths they made during the commencing ceremony of the new legislative term were unqualified. From 2017 to 2019, several leading activists of the 2014 Umbrella Movement were sentenced to jail. Pro-independence activists, including Edward Leung, who were charged with initiating a “riot” in 2016, faced the same fate and they got a much heavier sentence. Two of them are now forced to seek asylum in Germany. For many Hong Kong people, the city is no longer the one they are familiar with. The proposed legislation of the extradition agreement with China in recent months came to be the last straw.

The extradition bill, formally known as the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance Amendment, was tabled after a Hong Kong man murdered his girlfriend in Taiwan and then returned to Hong Kong last year. Since there has been no extradition agreement between Hong Kong and Taiwan, the Hong Kong government claimed it was a loophole to be plugged. An amendment to the current Fugitive Offenders Ordinance was therefore proposed in February 2019, which would allow for extradition requests from authorities in mainland China, Taiwan, and Macau for criminal suspects. ​​​​​​​Once the amendment is adopted, anyone, including permanent Hong Kong citizens, businessmen, journalists, and visitors of whatever nationalities, could be accused to have violated Chinese laws in Hong Kong and extradited to China. Since the Chinese government often uses non-political charges to prosecute political dissent, and since there is no fair trial in mainland China, it is deeply worrying that this would pose another great threat to the human rights of Hongkongers. Although the Taiwanese authority has stated its concern about the possibility that Taiwanese citizens in Hong Kong could be extradited to mainland China, and although it is possible for the Hong Kong and Taiwanese governments to make a one-time extradition agreement, the Hong Kong government insisted on pushing forward the current version of amendment. Worse still, the government argued the urgency required to handle the current murder case allowed for only 20 days for public consultation.

Rejecting the extradition bill amendment, the civil society of Hong Kong, which had been low in morale after the failure of the Umbrella Movement, has become vibrant again. The fragmented relationship between the moderate and the radical flanks has been glued. Apart from the demonstration and the occupy action mentioned above, there were 3,000 lawyers, prosecutors, law students, and academics marching in silence to request the government shelve the bill earlier this month. University and secondary school students and alumni, overseas students, and many other civil society groups also started hundreds of petitions to protest against the amendment. More actions are going to be held in coming days, including a creative action to “occupy” the cars of the underground train—a non-cooperative action attempting to paralyze the city without confronting the police directly. Also, more petitions are going on locally and internationally, such as the one to request the U.S, British, and Australian governments to block or reject the visas of the Hong Kong officials and the pro-China legislators—many of whom claim themselves as patriotic, loyal Chinese while holding a second nationality and lots of assets in the West. We do not know what will work, but as Lu Xun, a leading Chinese writer, famously said, “although originally there was no path on the ground, as more and more people walked through, it became a path.”

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道義責任

如果我身在香港，今年的六四晚會還是會選擇去的，理由其實好簡單：

1. 我知道有不少人會覺得悼念六四不是香港這個共同體的事。但當我知道雨傘運動時，身在極權國度的蘇昌蘭、陳啟棠、王默、謝文飛、張聖雨、梁勤輝、甄江華及很多支援者，因為聲援傘運相繼入獄，或被監控。他們在爭取「自己的國家」的人權自由公義民主的時候，沒有因為香港只是偏遠的南方一隅而選擇對不公義視而不見。如果共產黨是我們的共同敵人的話，那麼去六四晚會，喊結束一黨專政，就是一種道義責任，也是對同路人的道謝。

2. 我知道不少人會覺得現在談六四事件只是鞏固家國情懷（雖然這種說法已被反駁過很多次），但我會仍會強調一點：這種說法對上一輩來說可能是valid，但由我這一輩80後開始肯定不是。我第一次去六四晚會是09年，亦即是反高鐵運動那一年。對我來說，平反六四，跟反高鐵的不公義，從來都是一體兩面的事，而從09、10那兩年六四晚會人數創新高來看，我相信這種說法都apply在他們身上的。因此我相信，年復年爭取平反六四，就是對本土民主運動的另一種參與。

3. 早前讀一篇關於六四事件的英國檔案解密報道，見到報道下面有個留言：「又消費六四情意結」。我驚訝，原本咁都叫消費？唔係fa？對很多人而言，參加六四晚會既然「沒有用」，那只會成為一個幫泛民和支聯會「吸金」的場合。事實上，李卓人何俊仁張文光長毛等等等等，從來沒有因為29年來的六四晚會而變成富豪。相反，不少晚會得來的資金的確是落在中國民運人士手上，發展公民社會。司徙華生前提過，每一封由支聯會寄給在囚民運人士的信，每一年六四晚會的人數，共產黨都會數著。你可以不滿意支聯會這班人做事守舊保守老套，但如果肉眼見不到「功效」，就等於「沒有用」，就等於消費情感，那無疑是對希望政治一個極度狹窄的理解。情感往往依附於一種時間性（temporality），如果你要求一種短期目標的效果論，要證明「因為我參加了六四晚會，而今年的晚會又成功令共產黨削弱了xx%」，這無疑是不切實際，甚至變成一種虛無主義（邏輯上你今晚如常食飯瞓覺，都唔保證你長命百歲的）。但如果我們將時間性拉長一點，對目標的理解闊一點，六四晚會（及其他民主運動的episodes）其實已經發揮了不少肉眼見不到效用。例如09年後年青人政治參與大幅提升，而共產黨的authority亦由爭取認同、統戰，變成赤裸裸的鎮壓，正正反映政權的合法性不斷被削弱。因此我們不應因為覺得「做乜都無用」，而絕望，遠離政治，拒絕理會六四。如果改變對情感的時間性的理解，現在正是希望的開始。

虛無主義是極權統治的最佳戰友。我知道決定了不去晚會的人不會因為我講幾句cliché 的話而改變主意。我失望的不是香港未有民主，共產黨未被推翻，六四未被平反（again，這是情感的時間性的問題），而是發覺原來身邊不少朋友已經慢慢被虛無的氣息包圍。

總辭不總辭？

寫於2017年7月16日。

事旦講幾句：

其實由梁天琦被篩走一刻，整個選舉制度及議會已經失去合法性。先戴個頭盔，其實當時寫過幾句，認為泛民需要集體杯葛選舉。DQ 6只是同一個故事的不同版本。對於杯葛或是總辭，我的原則一樣。

記得當時網上最普遍的批評，和今次相類似，都是說畀建制派橫行無忌呀、加劇貧富懸殊呀、加深官商勾結呀、畀惡法直接通過呀…...乜乜物物。但其實泛民留左喺議會20年，建制派咪一樣橫行無忌？貧富懸殊咪一直加劇？官商勾結咪一樣繼續？布咪一樣照剪？橫洲撥款咪一樣照過？我懷疑下次建制派嘅賤格程度，應該會昇華到喺唔改議事規則下連人數都唔畀點，泛民乜都冇得玩。如果好似區家麟咁話，總辭支持者認為總辭可以激起市民反感抗爭只是「政治科幻小說式的預言」，那總辭反對者期望留守議會可以做到的，其實同幻想都無乜分別。更何況如果惡法將臨，例如臨立會重立的公安條例，當日動員不到的不代表今天動員不到。社會動員有其他結構性因素及大量的contingency（詳見下面），將來的事無人估到，所以總辭支持者 / 反對者在這方面上，當打個和，誰也不能說服誰。

既然原則一樣，那是否應該總辭？今次我的答案是否定的。我頭腦簡單，唔識好似區家麟咁分析10個迷思同楊岳橋咁寫個總辭百科。我純粹諗work定唔work，如下：

當時我提出的集體杯葛選舉與今次的總辭，是兩個很不同的語境。當時被篩走的是政壇當紅炸子雞，而當時梁振英仍未宣佈放棄連任，民間社會仍然有一個相當明顯的同共敵人（我意思是，比「共產黨」這個概念更貼身），可以集中火力對準特首選舉作另一次大型動員。

更何況，「梁天琦事件」本身是一個moral shock，但moral shock呢啲野，一次就好shock，第二、三次就叫司空見慣、習以為常，憤怒呢種情感，很難作為長久的動員基礎。只要睇下上次梁天琦同今次DQ4事件的集會人數，就知分別。就算總辭，動員能量有限。

過去10多年的社會/政治運動動員，能夠稱很上超大型而持久的，其實都是靠一些極貼身的議題帶起，例如：

反高鐵運動突然爆出個669億呢個數，動員力即時倍增；支撐反國教的，是「你來搞我個仔?!」的恐懼/恐共感；激發雨傘運動的，是對於「純潔」學生被捕及催淚彈的義憤填膺的感覺（如果爭普選真的是上街主因，那麼在學聯罷課期間應該一早已塞爆金鍾）。就算計埋03年，反23條最多是因素之一，其他更重要的因素，其實是民生問題，同埋大家都想狠狠地屌老董同孽瘤一鑊，03年那次場「民主運動」，是事後的建構。

DQ呢件事，對於一般香港人，仍然是「太政治」，太離身，根本不可能有持久的參與，更遑論「由人民監察議會」及「癱瘓議會」。

既然總辭不能確保賬面有賺，那不如保住本錢，用既有資源發掘更多如反高鐵、反國教般的貼身議題，為下一次大型動員打好基礎。請記住，傳統飯民過去的失敗，不是單單的「戀棧議席」，而是他們沒有利用議席給予的本錢搞好政策研究，所以每次對抗政府都只是臨時抱佛腳。餘下的泛民議員應如何分配工作，接收DQ6 + 1的政策議題、研究成果及論述，才是當下最應討論的問題。

p.s. 其實我有睇開冰球同NHL嘅習慣。冰球有個球例，犯規球員要被罰出場2分鐘甚或5分鐘，在這段時間球隊只能5個打人地6個，有時不小心甚至會4打6。那麼被罰球隊在那段時間就只能靠4個或者3個場區球員縮後，盡量緊貼龍門，用血肉之驅將對方射球擋住。當然在這段時間被失球的機會很高，但守得好的話，就能令對方多花氣力要不段傳波、走位才可以找到射球路線，直至捱到被罰球員返回球場。好彩的話，short-handed goal（即人數較少下入波）其實也很常見的。

好撚多野做好眼瞓，寫住咁多先

Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Movement Losing Hope

500,000 people demonstration, referendum for universal suffrage, 79-days Occupy Movement……efforts to fight for democracy in the past decade or so have not yet paid off. The Chief Executive election of Hong Kong held on March 26, 2017 remained as a political game dominated by the power elites, most of whom have direct or indirect political and economic relationships with the Beijing government. Unlike the past four Chief Executive elections, the democrats neither boycotted the Beijing-controlled election nor nominated a candidate to expose the loopholes of the existing political system. This time, they chose to support a pro-China, and somewhat anti-democracy, candidate in the name of public opinion.

To understand the democrats’ weird move, we need to have a brief knowledge about the political system which has shaped the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong over the past two decades. Since the handover of sovereignty from Britain to China in 1997, Hong Kong has become the Special Administrative Region of China. The first two Chief Executives of Hong Kong were elected by the Election Committee (EC), a committee formed by 800 major political and business figures who purport to represent the majority view of the Hong Kong people. As stipulated in the Basic Law, the mini-constitution of Hong Kong written by the Beijing government and some pro-Beijing politicians in the 1980s, such undemocratic setting would ultimately be replaced by one-person-one-vote within 10 years after the handover. However, the promise has never realized. Through re-interpreting the Basic Law in 2004 and 2007, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) of the Beijing government delayed the progress of democratization and ruled that no universal suffrage would be held in Hong Kong until 2017. Despite such promise, the NPCSC has set high threshold for the nominating process of the Chief Executive election, meaning that such “universal suffrage” could easily be manipulated by Beijing and would not be a genuine one. Political reform based on the NPCSC decision was thus vetoed in 2014 and the Chief Executive election of this year continued to adopt the previous method of election: a 1200-members EC [1] is going to decide who is the leader of Hong Kong. Although some democrats can become a member of the EC under the current institutional design, their voices are never loud enough to influence the election result [2]. All they can do is to nominate a pro-democracy candidate to make some dissent voices (like what they did in 2007 and 2012) or use their votes to force the pro-Beijing candidates to make some concession to the pro-democracy movement.

Capitalizing the momentum of the 79-days Occupy Movement in 2014 and the growing discontent towards the Beijing authority in the civil society, the Hong Kong democrats made a small breakthrough to obtain more than 300 seats in the EC election last year. Although this could be a good chance to at least make a stronger democratic claim and advance the pro-democracy movement, the democrats ruined it all. On the one hand, they did not come up with a clear goal of what they should do other than stopping the incumbent Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying, an assertive hardliner and a pro-Beijing politician, from running for five more years. On the other, they were obviously unprepared to deal with the landslide support for one of the Chief Executive candidates, John Tsang Chun-wah, the former Financial Secretary of the Hong Kong government, in the civil society.

The success of John Tsang was unexpected for both the democrats and observers, but it could not be simply understood as an excellent political spinning project. Instead, it should be interpreted as a mobilization of political emotions. To compete with his major contender, Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor [3], the former Chief Secretary of the government, who was widely perceived as Beijing’s favourite, John Tsang popularized himself among the Hong Kong citizens not so much by a drastically different policy agenda but by an emotional mobilization. Contrary to Carrie Lam, the image of whom was often seen as the parallel of Leung Chun-ying, John Tsang presented himself not only as a benevolent leader but as a good husband, a friendly former fencing coach, a martial arts lover, and a guy who loves the local, grassroots culture of Hong Kong. Blurring the line between the public and the private realms, John Tsang showed the public his “authentic self”, something people long for in the era in which people no longer trust the politicians and in which political emotions have increasingly been managed [4] by the Beijing authority in the name of patriotism. Subverting the conventional wisdom that politics is dirty among the Hong Kong citizens, John Tsang’s image was so fresh and friendly that people could not stop following him.

John Tsang’s play of political emotions was much more than that. Rightly identified anxiety, anger, and hatred as the dominant emotional climate [5] of the Hong Kong society over the past few years, John Tsang deployed “Trust, Hope, Unity” as his campaign slogan. By contrasting the current devastating socio-political situation of Hong Kong with the good old days of the early 1990s [6] in his propaganda, John Tsang effectively manipulated the notion of hope to invoke memory of the past society, a depoliticized society with rapid economic growth. Yet, it was by no means a progressive political vision. Scholars of Hong Kong studies have generally agreed that what apparent political stability and economic prosperity of the 1990s masked were the unquestioning support of a neoliberalist market economy and the tacit acceptance of an undemocratic (but administratively efficient) government. If John Tsang was advocating a political vision, it was more about bringing Hong Kong back to an era in which all inconvenient truths were hidden and all people were economic and apolitical animals than mobilizing people to care about the political future of the city to fight for a democratic, free, and equal society. John Tsang’s notion of hope was about the future, but such future was articulated with an unachievable and unprogressive past. In a political climate filled with anxiety, anger, and hatred, nostalgia simply fueled hope. John Tsang’s emotional mobilization worked extremely well. Just before the election, he achieved a support rate of over 60% in public opinion poll, almost a double ahead of Carrie Lam.

Hope, an emotion usually used by the leftist and the liberal, was effectively appropriated by John Tsang. Confronting anxiety, anger, and hatred, John Tsang provided the Hong Kong people with the subversive emotions of hope, happiness, and optimism. The Hong Kong people were once again mobilized and unified [7] like what happened during the 79-days Occupy Movement in 2014. Yet this time they were not standing for the broader liberal, democratic goals but a politician who was a core supporter of the neoliberalist market economy, who has never made any concrete pledge to democratization, and who was at most a rebel within the pro-establishment camp. Debates, disputes, and disagreements were haunting the democratic camp in the past two months. Social cleavage was once again deepened due to diverged opinions regarding whether the democratic EC members should abstain or vote for a popular candidate who might never help advancing democracy. At the end, the Hong Kong democrats chose to dance with the devil and cast their votes to John Tsang in the name of public opinion. Indeed, no matter which side they choose and no matter who wins the election [8], they have already lost the heart of the Hong Kong people. The mainstream public sentiment has already chosen to side with a pro-establishment political figure rather than the democrats and trusted that he could bring a better “future”.

Losing hope, the Hong Kong democrats are losing ground. The democrats will have a hard time to regain the momentum of the pro-democracy movement in coming years. Perhaps the first and foremost task for them is to learn how to do efficient emotional work in political mobilization. Anger and hatred have been deployed for mobilizing democratic campaigns in the past two to three years, but these two emotions alone have been insufficient to make good impact, as previous campaigns have repeatedly proven. So what would be the right and effective emotions for mobilizing successful pro-democracy campaigns? It is time for them to learn from John Tsang.

[1] The number of EC member was increased from 800 to 1200 in 2012 under the political reform in 2010.

[2] All EC members must go through an election. However, such election has been tightly controlled by the Beijing government through its invisible hand in the political and business sectors of the Hong Kong society. This means most EC members are likely to be pro-China, allowing the Beijing government to control the Chief Executive election easily.

[3] Another candidate of the election was Woo Kwok-hing, a retired judge.

[4] Sociologist Arlie Hochschild argues in her book The Managed Heart that emotions have been more and more falling under the control of capitalist institutions whose goal is to increase consumption. But the more emotions are being managed, the more people search for an authentic self and genuine expression of emotions.

[5] This is largely the result of the massive Occupy Movement in 2014. On the one hand, people who support democratization have become more hostile to the Beijing authority, the Hong Kong government, and the Hong Kong police, and become more worried about the political future of the city. On the other hand, the powerholders have mobilized even stronger counter-movement to halt democratization. Social cleavage has been deepened over the past few years and mutual trust has been declining.

[6] Despite their apparent political dispute over democratization of Hong Kong, both the British colonial government and the Beijing government had joined to carry out a political-economic engineering project to make Hong Kong as prosperous as possible before the handover. For the British colonial government, they wanted a glorious departure. For the Beijing government, they wanted a respectable city to celebrate the national political project of re-gaining the sovereignty of Hong Kong. Political stability and economic prosperity were hence the two main themes in the dominant discourses of Hong Kong in the early 1990s.

[7] It is believed that John Tsang’s supporters come from three camps: the centralists, the mild democratic supporters, and the mild pro-China supporters.

[8] At the end, Carrie Lam won the election by securing 777 votes, while John Tsang and Woo Kwok-hing could only manage to obtain 365 votes and 21 votes respectively. It is interpreted that the Beijing authority has done a lot behind the scenes to help Carrie Lam to secure her votes.

向曾俊華學習

人老轉數慢，想梳理一下「曾俊華現象」一些有關政治情感的問題，想了幾天還是想不通。只能草草地總結幾點：

1. 所謂政治情感，不單單是公關技巧的問題，亦不是因為你思想不夠精闢敏銳而被政壇騙子蒙騙。情感存在於社會關係中，有其結構性。情感是個人感受到的，亦是屬於社會大眾的。所謂情感，是政治論述、影像及行動產生出來的「後果」，不是單純發自內心的生理「感受」。每個社會有其主流情感，是社會成員共同感受到的。權力關係既影響政治論述及行動，亦塑造主流情感的建構，但主流情感可以被挑戰，製造另類情感。曾俊華過去兩個多月給予香港人的，正是一個透過生產另類情感，挑戰恐懼、焦慮、仇恨等主流情感的政治動員。

2. 社會學家Arlie R. Hochschild說，我們正身處一個時刻都在「管理情感」的年代。服務員對你笑，不是真心歡迎你，而是透過管理自己的情感和情感表達方式，令你感覺良好，從而增加消費。此邏輯在政治領域同樣適用。在擠眉弄眼的年代，當權者天天對你說國家是在關心你、為你好；要你愛國、對著國旗心情激動。但Hochschild指出，情感愈是被管理，人們便愈追求所謂「真摰」的情感和「發自內心」的舉動。曾俊華比林鄭受歡迎，除了是因為林鄭面目猙獰，更加是因為曾俊華夠「真」。仁慈的劍擊教練、熱愛中國武術、和下屬玩埋一堆、和市民玩「曾．connect」、「曾．心mean」，全都是展示最「曾」一面。

3. 「希望」是曾俊華競選口號其中一個主打重點。現於浸大任教的社會學家Jack M. Barbalet指出，情感往往與回憶及過去經驗扣連，從而指導未來的行動方向。「希望」之所以成功動員群眾，除了是對比起當下的恐懼、焦慮、仇恨所產生出來的效果，亦是因為重新勾起在90年代香港出現的一系列美好（但回歸後一直未能落實的）想像：繁榮安定、社會穩定、遠離政治（而前設僅是有一個正正常常、循規蹈矩的政府及官僚架構）。曾俊華所說的「休養生息」，換個說法就是90年代的「維持現狀」。還是杜sir的話夠精警：「未來要睇到嘅和諧嘅香港……為未來三十年好好地建立番一個我地由細到大，只有希望嘅香港」。這個香港，其實就是90年代只管經濟發展、去政治化的香港社會。今天社會、政治烏煙瘴氣的環境下，90年代再次成為香港人對未來的寄託，而「曾俊華」就好像一個empty signifier，讓大家將所有美好想像通通投射進去，團結香港人。

4. 我們不難理解為何一班進步左派會看這場選戰看到咬牙切齒。「希望」本是他們的「專用主打」情感，這次卻被一個新自由主義者、建制派中人挪用，而玩得有聲有色，出神入化，做到不少社運都做不到的動員效果。如何向曾俊華學習，奪回對「希望」的發言權，導向進步、民主自由的方向，必然成為一眾民主派、左派的新難題。在此搬字過紙，引用幾篇文章談過的幾個觀點。雖然聽起來無甚新意，但希望拋磚引玉，刺激思考社會運動如何重奪情感動員的主導權。

Ron Aminzade及Doug McAdam在一篇討論情感與社會運動的文章中指出，憤怒必須結合希望才能成功動員群眾。至於如何燃起希望，主要有以下幾點：

4a. 廣義的文化轉向，令人憧憬改變未來，造就社運形成，例如近年香港年青人的後物質價值轉向，造就多場大大小小的社會行動。但文化轉變不是一朝一夕形成，要深耕細作，才能改變主導文化話語權。例如梁啟智博士日前發表的「對抗林鄭行動綱領」所言，胡官也不是一早懂得談棕土，而是靠多個民間團體近年的努力才能帶起議題。因此，還是老套那句，要有希望，首先是不要絕望。深耕細作，自有回報。

4b. 政治機會的出現，是指既有政治版圖中的權力移位，為社會運動員帶來較大空間，令公民社會感覺到一絲取勝希望。雖然在港式精英分裂中，建制派的內部矛盾往往會隨著中央一鎚定音而火速歸位，令民主派拉攏部分商界的希望瞬間幻滅。但社會學家Jack M. Barbalet提到，恐懼不只局限於缺乏權力的人，手握權力的人有時亦會因恐懼（elite fear），怕自己既有地位動搖，而作出制度性的變革。商界在5年前梁振英上台時所出現的反彈，正好說明這種情緒。雖然本地商界與中共/紅色資本的裂痕會否進一步加深並非民主派能完全控制的事，但我們或者可以透過行動，讓本地商界體會封閉的政治制度及其衍生的官商勾結，會令其自食其果。例如幫襯小店、罷買四大地產商旗下的所有貨/樓，逼他們親嘗自己種下的惡果，變相拉攏/逼使他們成為民主運動一分子。這些都是我們能做的一小步。

4c. 累積每場小勝利的能量。雖然民主運動至今未成功，但由03七一計起，公民社會「贏粒糖」的次數也不少：利東街運動的由下而上重建方案、藍屋保育、菜園村成功爭取的集體搬村、雨傘運動中首次逼使政府對話…….雖然這些真的只是「小」勝利，但重提這些事件既不是失敗主義，亦不是打飛機自我安慰。須知道，即使成功如美國民權運動，也不是一朝一夕就完全改變不公平的社經制度。公民社會不需要妄自菲薄，因為「希望」的底氣就是從過去的小勝仗中積累出來的，重點是如何包裝和策略性運用這些資源。

5. 仇恨是過去兩、三年公民社會用來動員的主要情感。正如社會學家Helena Flam所言，當一個政體愈來愈封閉，仇恨作為動員的情感機會就愈大。但Flam亦指到，動員社運的情感可以由不同情感組合而成，帶來不同的動員效果和行動模式。世上沒有必勝的情感動員formula，學術研究不是包生仔。曾俊華選戰的成功，正正提醒我們，要檢視當下香港人不同的情感經驗和各種情感組合的可能性。如果大家recall一下看曾俊華宣傳片的經驗，相信都有一面看，一面會心微笑的時刻。今天，我們是否應重新檢視快樂抗爭的可能性及其能量？快樂又如何可以和信心、樂觀及希望等情感結合，產生不同的動員力。我只是想說，我們既不需摒棄憤怒和仇恨，也不需將快樂抗爭等同和理非非。我們不應過份標榜或污名化某一情感，因為成功的社運動員需要不同情感組合。例如雨運頭十多日的強大動員能力，正正是憤怒、仇恨、希望、快樂、樂觀、恐懼的有機組合。雨運最終的失敗，不是簡單的退場與否的問題，而是未能隨著形勢轉變而改變情感動員的模式，讓一、兩種情感（e.g. 憤怒、仇恨）過份主導，令運動逐漸失去本來擁有動員能力。

（轉載於《立場新聞》，題為「「曾俊華現象」背後的政治情感動員

」：https://www.thestandnews.com/politics/%E6%9B%BE%E4%BF%8A%E8%8F%AF%E7%8F%BE%E8%B1%A1-%E8%83%8C%E5%BE%8C%E7%9A%84%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB%E6%83%85%E6%84%9F%E5%8B%95%E5%93%A1/）

只有兩條路：玩盡佢令議席過半 完全唔玩癱瘓制度

（寫於2016年8月2日）

1. 先殺在公眾知名度及支持度不高的陳浩天和楊繼昌，再殺在公眾心目中為畸呢怪一名的中出羊子，見你所謂民主派只是口頭譴責、網上鳩屌，大型動員欠奉，就可以放心做野。這叫試水溫。

2. 其實只要有正常智力，也能判斷確認書根本沒有法理依據，選管會只是一個行政機構，沒有權作政治決定，完。這點你知，我知，粱振英知、林鄭知、袁國強知，但既然你民主派沒有大型動員，極其量也只能申請不能改變任何決定的選舉呈請及遠水不能救近火的司法覆核，殺埋你梁天琦又如何？

3. 泛民眼前的選擇不多，但不應局限於司法覆核或衝台搶咪。司法覆核係要做，衝係要繼續衝，我對這兩個方法沒有負面評價，只是覺得不限於此。抗爭repertoire要常更新，如果只如何秀蘭所言「一眾泛民主流政黨回立法會後…嚴正跟進」，港共政權真係開心都來唔切，因為在現有議會制度下，建制派真係驚你有牙。

4. 港共政權殺民族黨、梁天琦，但放青年新政、熱普城參選，分別在於前者打正旗號獨立，是完全否定現有憲法及議會制度，而後者充其量是推動意義仍相當模糊的民族自決，甚至只是所謂的永續基本法，對現有制度衝擊有限。如果如熱普城支持者話齌，對抗今次確認書事件的方法是將狂人帶入議會、以癲制癲，恐怕真係諗多左。因為「狂」最終只會被制度邏輯吸納，就如當年的掟蕉、掟杯，今天只等同R痕。

5. 改變現狀的路只有兩條，一是玩盡佢，令議席過半；二是完全唔玩。

前者的願景固然美好，但雷動計劃協調之困難，在此不贅。後者從來都是泛民禁忌，對於他們來說，失去議席就如失去打位置之戰的本錢。但今天已入閘的泛民是否應該想想，面對今天一個已經完全失去法理基礎的立法會選舉，玩下去又是否值得？玩下去的話固然可以藉今次議題，多贏一兩席，但是否亦同時加強了一個有確認書「僭建」的選舉的認受性？其實共產黨最不想見到的，不是一個有很多泛民的議會，而是一個都沒有泛民的議會，因為這才突顯它一言堂的真面目。

如果失去了所謂的否決權，而建制派藉此通過惡法，泛民換來的是更大的道德光環及更多的動員本錢。如果現在要說一句老土話，「團結一致，槍口對外」，那泛民可以做的就是集體杯葛選舉，以極低投票率突顯今次選舉的荒謬，同時將動員火力集中推倒2017小圈子特狗選舉，並借反確認書的餘勢，舉行自決公投，以（預料）進一步上升的港獨支持率向中共施壓。

又或者，泛民當選後立即辭職，就確認書議題舉行公投，將數年後司法覆核勝出後的重新選舉，變相提前舉行，將篩選制度徹底摧毀。只有集體唔玩，或集體走人，才能真正癱瘓一個失去法理基礎的制度。

【頭盔】係，我知，咁講係120%離地及理想化，所以我相信一切也不會發生。

（轉載於《立場新聞》：https://thestandnews.com/politics/%E5%8F%AA%E6%9C%89%E5%85%A9%E6%A2%9D%E8%B7%AF-%E7%8E%A9%E7%9B%A1%E4%BD%A2%E4%BB%A4%E8%AD%B0%E5%B8%AD%E9%81%8E%E5%8D%8A-%E5%AE%8C%E5%85%A8%E5%94%94%E7%8E%A9%E7%99%B1%E7%98%93%E5%88%B6%E5%BA%A6/）

1989與2009，當六四扣連上本土

寫以下這些，源於我一直不太明白，為甚麼「（去維園）悼念六四 = 身中大中華情花毒 = 被民族主義綁架」可以劃上等號。

「施毒 / 中毒」、「綁架 / 被綁架」，從來都牽涉兩個parties。有班愛國傻佬/ 婆向你落毒，你受唔受，從來都由自己決定。如果支聯會有這超能力下這毒手，去過維園的人，應該早已「毒發身亡」，忙於搞愛國民主運動，而從來不會發生以「香港人」為主體的反國教、雨傘革命等社會/政治運動。

只要翻查數據，重溫歷史，不難發現，實情並不如本土青年所言般悲觀。「愛國民主運動 vs 本土民主運動」、「大中華膠 vs 本土身份」無非是一堆虛假的二元對立，除了在公民社會提起一場頗為無謂口舌之爭，卻無助我們思考六四的本土意義。

如果悼念六四是大中華情意結洗腦，那麼本土身份的建立，理應受到相當大的限制，但翻查過去幾年的數據，兩者其實並行不悖，甚至相輔相成。時間回到2009年，當時正值六四20週年，15萬人參與支聯會六四悼念晚會。香港大學民意研究計劃在09年6月8至13日的身份認同調查發現，認同自己為「香港人」的比例，由上一年年尾21.8%回升至24.7%；認同自己為「中國人」的，則由08年汶川大地震時38.6%（08年中）及34.4%（08年尾）的高位，回落至29.3%。如果六四晚會可以成功將參加者洗腦成為大中華膠，只顧參與愛國民主建設的話，那之後時期的「香港人」認同的百分比，邏輯上只會下跌，至少不會超過當時的水平。但實情是，到2009年尾另一輪民意調查，認同為「香港人」的百分比，卻急升至37.6%，而「中國人」認同則繼續下跌至24.2% [註1]。

與此同時，認為香港人有責任推動中國民主發展的人，亦沒有因2009年起六四晚會人數大幅上升而顯著增加。港大民研的數據顯示，2005年至2010年間，支持上述說法的百分比，一直徘徊於約75至77%水平，至2011年才顯著回落 [註2]。換句話說，那幾年間的確是多了人去維園唱k，卻不一定代表多了人浪費精力於愛國民主運動上，而吸乾本土民主運動的能量。相反在2010年年中，香港人在創六四晚會人數新高時，還有心力搞了個史無前例的五區公投。如果說悼念六四等於浪費時間和精力的話，這說法未免太低估香港人鳥。

我想透過以上數字說的，不是支聯會舉辦的晚會實際上有多大效能，當然亦不是替支聯會多年來圍城偏安心態和對較細小團體的「蝦蝦霸霸」辯護，而是要說明，（去維園）悼念六四與參與本土民主運動本身就不是對立。重點是，參加者本身有詮釋活動的能力，他們不一定先要完全認同支聯會綱領才去參與集會，也不會因為參與而被主辦者的受國民族主義綁架。反之，他們會因為當時的社會環境，為活動增加新的（本土）意義。如果硬要將支聯會說成是影響一代又一代香港人心智，壞了你偉大的本土民主大業的罪魁禍首，那恐怕說不過去。這種邏輯，和大公文匯那些「泛民政黨操控年青人」、當人無腦諗野的自大兼硬膠說法，又有甚麼分別？

再者，我從來認為，民主運動的參與者，應各施各法。不同意的，最多各有各做，我實在想不到要在公民社會內部惡言相向，非要將對方置諸死地不可的理由。如果你有「生於89年後，與中國內地毫無感情可言」的歷史經驗，也請尊重社會上有人「在97大限前，由極端無助和恐懼發展出民主抗共策略」的歷史經驗。那從來不是世代差異的問題，而是民主運動參與者面對異議的應有態度。

既然六四晚會無關「大中華 / 本土」對立的問題，那麼它的本土意義又是甚麼？

不少論者認為，八九六四是香港人的政治啟蒙，開始告別難民社會，建立道德共同體。但當年參與者的情感，很大程度上是基於恐懼、悲憤，而站在邪惡的對立面。所謂「民主」、「人權」、「自由」的內涵，始終不明不白，或輕輕帶過。八九六四，無疑是「破」了香港人與政治絕緣的難民心態，但建「立」的本土意義和香港核心價值又是甚麼？對於我這八十後來說，為六四賦予本土意義的工程，其實一直含糊不清，直至2009年。

時間再一次來到2009年。如上文所述，參與悼念六四的人，會因為社會環境因素而為其添加新的意義。我認為，正是當年的所發生一連串的事件和社會運動，令六四的「本土」內涵真正豐富起來。

隨便Wiki一下，你會發現六四20週年前夕，出現過三大經典謬論。第一，是曾蔭權回應六四時說「我嘅意見就是代表香港人嘅整體意見」。第二，是港大學生會前會長陳一諤指鎮壓是「有啲問題」，但學生過激都有錯。第三，是呂智偉的「六四不算是屠城」論。相信大家都記得，當年出席六四晚會的15萬人，正是被這堆言論激發出來的。那便證明香港人念茲在茲的，正正是爭取拒絕被強權代表的自由、拒絕「1+1 = 3」的謊言、拒絕「人人都有責任，所以殺人錯唔晒」的假理性、真犬儒邏輯、拒絕被失憶的權利。這些都是繼承八九年港人一種是非黑白分明的公義觀，而將這種公義觀延續至二十年後，甚至以後的香港，仍是將自己與大陸共產政權、以及與滿腦子充滿犬儒歪理的強國人區別開來的重要工具。這些聲音，不就是香港人在反國教、雨傘革命一直拼命追求的嗎？

但當平反六四難以因悼念而有寸進（因為連佔領運動也未能撼動中共），我們就該改以冷漠看待，從此讓六四脫離新一代香港民主運動嗎？我認為，如果六四對今天的參與者仍有上述意義，以至仍可以作為定義本土身份的手段的話，那便需要將六四重新扣連上本土民主運動。2009年尾那場浩浩蕩蕩的反高鐵運動，正好將兩者結合，成為民主運動的兩把利刀。反高鐵運動息乘03年後保衛利東街、天星、皇后碼頭的氣勢，教曉香港人主動介入都市治理及資源分配的政治過程的重要性，開始建立起公民主體，指向一種民主性公民身份（Democratic citizenship） [註3]。傳統公民身份著重公民的政治、經濟及社福權利，但「權利」本身是被動及靜態的，也有一種等待自上而下改變的傾向。民主性公民身份則著眼於主動爭取參與公共決策及規劃，將公民身份從建立日常生活民主的過程中的實踐出來。與此同時，這種主動參與的行動，不單有力地反對由上而下的中港融合，更讓人加強了對本土社區作為地方（place）——一個具有日常生活意義、讓人紮根的地方——的認同感，為「民主」（議會的民主與日常生活的民主）和「自由」（拒絕為所謂「國家」犧牲所謂「小我」的自由）添上實質意義。

如果反高鐵運動為香港人宣告成為「公民」的起點，認清「呢度我主場」，那之後一年的五區公投便將「自決」（雖然當年沒有用上這詞彙）的理念深化，進一步確立香港人的主體性。2009年起連續數年六四晚會超過15萬的人數，正好說明參與六四晚會已經不僅是一個區分香港與中國其他城市的標記，也不再局限於純粹區分共產黨的「壞」與香港的「好」，而是為香港人這共同體賦予實質的「核心價值」。09年起的社會及政治運動，將香港人重視的價值與公民權利反覆演練，悼念六四則作為一個具震懾力、保存共同體集體回憶的儀式。當然有人會反對所謂的「行禮如儀」，但悼念六四作為儀式，卻是讓共同體立根於某一傳統之上的重要過程，為共同體日後的集體行動，提供道德資源和基礎。

悼念六四與本土民主運動的關係是共生的，互相借力。沒有反高鐵運動，就沒有六四晚會連年創新高。反之，沒有悼念六四，就不會有之後以香港人和本土價值為核心的一連串社會及政治運動。

如果是單純地拒絕悼念六四，那恐怕只是拿起石頭砸自己本土運動的腳。八九六四以來，香港大大小小的社會/民主運動都以「抵抗式」的：反人大釋法、反廿三條、反高鐵、反新界東北發展計劃、反國教、雨傘革命（反八三一決定）等等。簡而言之，就是中共殺到埋身就抵抗他。重點是，如果不去認識悼念六四此儀式中的道德意義，與香港近20年的抵抗運動的扣連，而單單視之為與愛國民族主義捆綁，只會抹殺六四對本土民主運動深化為「進取型運動」（「我是甚麼」、「我要甚麼」，而非只是「我不是、不要甚麼」）的意義，把嬰兒連同髒水一併倒掉。

[1] 港大民研「巿民的身份認同感」調查https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/poll/datatables.html

[2] 港大民研「六四事件民意調查」

 https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/features/june4/datatables.html#q5

[3] Xia, Ying (2011). Citizenship in Practice: “Post-80” Activists in Hong Kong. PhD Dissertation, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.